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Abstracts
In the first chapter, we investigate the relationship between student test scores and discipline
outcomes in Texas public schools and whether or not schools participated in the Universal Free
Breakfast Program (UFB). Eating a routine breakfast leads to increased physical and mental per-
formance, as well as test scores. Surprisingly, there has been little focus on how eating a routine
breakfast affects disruptive behaviors. We compile a panel data set from two administrative sources
in Texas, spanning school years 2011/2012-2016/2107. Using fixed effects models, a staggered dif-
ference in differences model, and a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, we find that schools that
offer UFB experience higher test scores and have reduced conflict outcomes such as fights, sub-
stance abuse, and truancy. These results suggest that the benefit schools receive from taking part
in UFB are significant, help their students achieve better outcomes in schooling, behavior, general
well-being, and increase funding from lower truancy rates.
In the second chapter, we investigate how the technique of hydraulic fracturing or ”fracking”,
has made it possible to produce vast new quantities of oil and natural gas. States like Colorado,
Texas, and Oklahoma have seen a dramatic increase in the number of wells for both oil and natural
gas. In this study, the main source of exogenous variation to be explored is the location of oil and
natural gas well sites over time, relative to home locations. We estimate the effect of hydraulically
fractured natural gas and oil well sites on both urban and rural residential home prices between
2000 to 2018. The data stems from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security that lists locations
of all oil and natural gas wells, and from Zillow’s ZTRAX data base which contains home transac-
tion and administrative data. ArcGis is used to create varying buffer zones sizes around well sites,
x
exploring how average home prices changed before and after a well opens. First, a zip code level
fixed effects model is used. Second, household level fixed effects models and repeat sales models
are implemented. Lastly, a spatial differences in differences (SDID) approach is used. Our results
show that homes within .5 mile of a well have a 2.9% increase in selling price and homes that are
.5-1 mile from a well site see a 1.2% increase compared to homes that are more than 2 miles away.
In the third chapter, we are interested in flat rate tuition and how it has effected student registration
behaviors and academic performance. The cost to attend college has risen drastically over the past
decade. This sharp increase has caused universities to reevaluate tuition pricing schemes how they
charge tuition in efforts to keep enrollments and revenue’s high. There is growing interest in flat
rate tuition (FRT) where tuition is based on 15 credit hours per term for students enrolled in 12-19
hours. Thus, the marginal cost for over 15 credit hours is effectively zero. This new tuition pricing
system has two big impacts on the student body. First, it can alter the academic performance of
students. Second it can alter their registered and attempted semester course loads. Using a linear
probability model and fixed effects regression models, find that under FRT, students register for
more classes, attempt more credit hours, and have higher semester, yearly, and graduation GPA’s
compared to students that paid per credit hour. Using a rich data set from the University of Okla-
homa, we compare cohorts of students facing different tuition schemes: no FRT (or per credit hour
tuition), 1, 2, or 3 years of FRT, and all years of FRT, from the Fall of 2008 to Spring of 2018.
xi
Chapter 1
Breakfast of Champions: Universal Free
Breakfast, Student Conflict, and Test Scores
in Texas Schools
Breakfast has been called the most important meal of the day. According to the USDA dietary
guidelines, we should all be aiming to consume around 15 percent to 25 percent of our daily energy
intake at breakfast. Studies have proven that after our bodies have been at rest overnight, individ-
uals who wake up and fuel their bodies generally have better vitamin and nutrient consumption,
enjoy healthier diets, and are less prone to being overweight or obese (Betts et al. [2014]). Unfor-
tunately, food insecurity plagues millions of children in the United States. According to the No
Kid Hungry project run by the USDA, roughly 13 million children (one out of every six) live in
houses without sufficient access to food. In Texas, one in five students is at risk of going hungry.
With a lack of proper nutrition, specifically in the morning and at lunch time, these children are at
a huge disadvantage compared to their peers. Looking past the benefits school nutrition programs
may offer by helping to obtain a basic physiological need (Maslow [1943]), there is a growing
body of literature on the effects of offering school-wide free meals having impacts on a child’s
academic performance, body weights, and behavior. While a considerable amount of research has
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focused on the effects of eating a routine breakfast on physical, mental, and academic abilities,
very few studies have focused on the impact that eating a routine breakfast has on the behavior of
school-aged children in academic settings.
We add to the literature by presenting clear evidence that schools that participate in univer-
sal free breakfast (UFB) do indeed show an increased likelihood to meet or exceed state average
test scores and have lower rates of discipline infractions among their student population when
compared to schools that offer a standard breakfast program (SBP). Using data from the Texas Ed-
ucation Agency (TEA) that tracks schools meets or exceeds state test scores and discipline reports
for each school, we are able to compare schools that adopt UFB to those that do not to estimate
the causal impact of free school meals on discipline and academic performance. We find modest
increases in schools’ percentage of students that meet or exceed the passing rate for the Texas state
tests and a reduction in a schools discipline counts. Specifically, these reductions are meaningful
for truancy, code of conduct violations (in classroom disruptions), and substance abuse.
We explore the potential for UFB to impact student test scores and disciplinary actions through
at least two reasonable channels. While this paper is not able to clearly distinguish between them,
like previous literature, both channels contribute to the results. First, UFB could potentially reduce
the stigma associated with free or reduced meals, most noticeably in schools where a considerable
fraction of students do not qualify individually for free or reduced meals, thus improving the social
climate of the school. Marples and Spillman [1995] and Poppendieck [2010] both have conducted
surveys and student interviews suggesting that stigma discourages free meal consumption condi-
tional on eligibility, thus students who are eligible for free meals may be more willing to consume
those meals when offered school-wide via UFB. The second channel is UFB may improve nutri-
tional intake by increasing the share of students eating school meals.
The capability for UFB to increase the number of students eating free meals comes from two
sources. The first from students who would not be individually eligible but now have access
to free meals. Secondly, from students who would be eligible, but failed to return the proper
parental-reported family income forms needed to qualify. Furthermore, Leos-Urbel et al. [2013]
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investigated the impact of the implementation of a universal free school breakfast policy on meals
program participation, attendance, and academic achievement in New York City schools. They
found that post implementation participation increased among all students, including those previ-
ously eligible. Additionally, data from TEA shows raw number of breakfasts and lunches served
between UFB participating schools and those that do not (Figure 1), as well as yearly number of
schools that participate in each of the two breakfast type programs (Figure 2). Figure 1 shows that
both breakfast and lunch UFB participating schools serve more meals compared to schools that do
not participate. Lastly, the data shows that more disadvantaged or lower socioeconomic students
rely on schools for their primary source of meals. Schools’ districts are also aware of the need to
offer meals to school-age children during times when school is not in session. This can be seen
over the summer/winter breaks, or most recently during school closures for the 2020 COVID-19
pandemic. During this time, school districts had to shut down due to social distancing requirements
(USDA [2020], VOX [2020]). After schools had to shut down, they quickly came up with ways
to keep providing both breakfast and lunches, not only to their student body, but in most places to
any child that was under the age of 18. (Recommended to insert Figure 1 and 2 about here)
The main goal of this paper is to investigate how UFB influences the school environment,
specifically student behaviors and overall school test scores on state benchmark exams. Given the
acquired data and the constraints of the research design, we exploit variation across demographi-
cally similar schools based on participation in the UFB program. We investigate the link between
provision of universal free breakfast and disciplinary outcomes, which are available at the school
level. We focus on the total school level number of infractions, as well as the total number of code
of conduct, truancy, and substance abuse infractions in a school in a given year. Our assumption
is that within schools, changes in these infraction rates are correlated with changes in student be-
havior, as recognized by school facility and staff, but we do not assume that they are perfectly
correlated.
The data was acquired from the TEA and covers over 50 different conflict outcomes, span-
ning a course of 6 academic school years, and a schools ”meets or exceeds” rate on certain state
3
benchmark exams. We group similar discipline outcomes into categories1. The groups range from
the common code of conduct violation (daily disruptions), to substance abuse, truancy, and more
serious actions such as assault and vandalism. We are able to use fixed-effects and a difference
in differences model to estimate the average treatment effect between academic performance and
discipline reports at the school level. Additionally, in 2013, the Texas Senate Bill 376 (83rd Texas
Legislative Session) was passed requiring all schools (contracting entities [CEs]) who’s free and
reduced eligibility rate was equal to or grater than 80 percent to participate in UFB and provide
breakfast to all children at no charge. The passage of this Bill allows us to use a fuzzy regression
discontinuity design (FRD) to estimates the local average treatment effect.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 details the history of school
feeding programs in the US, as well as reviews the recent relevant literature. Section 3 describes
the data examined in this study. Section 4 outlines the methodical approaches adopted herein.
Finally, sections 5 and 6 present the main results and conclusion.
1.1 US School Feeding Programs and Student Outcomes
Initially established in 1966 as a 2-year pilot project designed to provide categorical grants
to assist schools serving breakfasts to “nutritionally needy” children, the school feeding program
expanded and was made permanent through Congressional Legislation in 1975 (USDA [2019]).
Student participation in the lunch program is high, with about 60 percent of the nation’s elemen-
tary school participating. However, from the children that participate in the lunch program, less
than one-third of these children participate in the school breakfast program. Among poor and
low-income children, most of whom are entitled to free school meals, participation is less than 25
percent (Burghardt et al. [1993]). One of the leading reasons behind the low participation rate in
subsidized meals is the negative stigma that can be associated with it as McGlinchy [1992] found.
Outside of helping to reduce negative stigma with subsidized meals, school feeding programs can
also help decrease food insecurity and other negative outcomes for children. These include phys-
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ical and mental health and social and interpersonal development (eg. Howard [2011]; Gundersen
and Kreider [2009]). Poorer health and increased food insecurity in a child’s early school-age years
has also been linked to worse long-term outcomes such as poorer health in adolescents and lower
educational attainment resulting in lower labor force participation in adulthood (Case et al. [2005]).
If these relationships from these correlational studies show any causal impact of higher food inse-
curity, then school meals programs could lead to improvements in student academic outcomes and
behaviors.
The federal government has implemented numerous programs whose goals are to reduce food
insecurity and improve nutrition in children and adults. Most notable of these programs include
the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as Food Stamps) and
the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC). Both are
aimed to provide assistance targeted to low-income families. In Texas, the law requires all schools
that have at least 10 percent of their students qualifying for the free/reduced program to offer a
Standard breakfast program (SBP) or Universal free breakfast (UFB), but after 2013, if a school
has at least 80 percent that fall under the free/reduced requirement, it is required to offer UFB.2
The major advantage of offering UFB over SBP is that more students that qualify for free/reduced
breakfast actually eat breakfast under UFB as opposed to SBP and students that were just above
the qualifying point for free or reduced meals now have access to free meals (Priorities [2015]).
As Gordon and Ruffini [2018] mentioned in their analysis of school meal programs and stu-
dent discipline, all analyses of income assistance programs, such as school meals, encounter two
specific challenges. In the case of the school feeding programs, at the national level they have
remained relatively unchanged since implementation. This limits the time and geographic varia-
tion available to study. Secondly, participation is non-random, since being eligible is limited to
those with low family incomes (eg.Bitler and Currie [2005]). There is a high probability that chil-
dren and adolescents who eat breakfast differ from those who do not eat breakfast in ways that
also influence educational outcomes. We know that socioeconomic status (SES) is associated with
breakfast eating, where children from higher SES backgrounds are more likely to regularly eat
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breakfast than children from lower SES backgrounds, and this finding is consistent across gender
and age (eg. Doku et al. [2013]; Hall et al. [2012]). Likewise, many researchers have shown that
SES is a central determinant of academic performance and cognitive ability (eg. McCulloch and
Joshi [2001]; Machin and Vignoles [2005]). With this negative relationship between family in-
come and health outcomes, students who participate in school meal programs and other nutritional
assistance programs, are more inclined to have poorer health outcomes without the program com-
pared to other ineligible individuals. Because of this, a simple comparison between these 2 groups
of students will tend to understate the benefits of school feeding programs. To overcome these
potential issues in the main analysis, we drop never participating schools’ to mitigate the selection
bias, along with accounting for the school-level characteristics of each school.
Previous literature finds that school meals program increases food consumption and nutritional
intake, with mixed effects on academic performance and overall health. There are several papers
that compare students in schools that offer SBP to similar students in schools that do not and they
generally find that participation in SBP generally improves nutritional intake during breakfast and
increases reading academic performance, but has mixed results on students overall nutritional in-
take (Bhattacharya et al. [2005]; Frisvold [2015]). Wodon et al. [2002] evaluated the impact of
government programs on social welfare and found that school breakfast programs have a targeting
performance that is very efficient and there are few differences in the allocation of benefits be-
tween program participants. Additionally, research from Gurley-Calvez and Higginbotham [2010]
showed that obesity negatively affects reading proficiency in high poverty districts. Complement-
ing that, List and Samek [2017] showed that school lunch and breakfast programs can help to serve
as a nudge to improve food choice and consumption in its student body. Studies such as Gundersen
and Kreider [2009] find that students who receive free school meals are associated with a lower
likelihood of poor health outcomes, including obesity and food insecurity. The positive effects of
breakfast are more demonstrable in children who are considered undernourished, typically defined
as one standard deviation below normal height or weight for age using the US National Center for
Health Statistics (NCHS) (eg. Pollitt et al. [2009]). In contrast, Dunifon [2002] do not find that
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NSLP significantly affects math or reading achievement or increase positive behaviors. Addition-
ally, Hinrichs [2010] found no effect of school lunches on short-term performance, but does find
that in the long-term school meals increase educational attainment. Competing against this, Imber-
man and Kugler [2014] and Frisvold [2015] both find that school breakfasts improve both reading
and math performances. Ruffini [2018] finds that math test score do improve and improvements
are concentrated among Hispanic and white students-groups with relatively low eligibility rates
under the traditional school meals program.
Most importantly for this study, a few pieces of newer research have come out that specifically
looks at schools’ access to universal free meals and academic performance. First, Dotter [2013]
found that universal breakfasts in the classroom increases math and reading test scores by 15
percent and 10 percent of a standard deviation on average, respectively. They found that gains
were higher in schools where fewer students were previously participating in school breakfasts,
specifically among students with lower achievement levels. Furthermore, these effects extended
in later years of treatment. They also found that moving breakfast into the classroom does not
significantly impact academic achievements in schools that had already implemented universal
free breakfast programs. These results suggest that offering UFB increases participation possibly
by reducing the associated negative social stigmas. It also suggests that the resulting positive
impacts on academic achievement are at least in part driven by the year round benefits rather than
only eating breakfast at the time of testing.
Following that, Schwartz and Rothbart [2020] investigates the impact of offering free school
lunch to all students on academic performance and lunch participation in New York City middle
schools. They found that free meals increases academic performance by as much as 0.083 standard
deviations in math and 0.059 in english/language arts for non-poor students, with smaller, statisti-
cally significant effects of 0.032 and 0.027 standard deviations in math and english/language arts
for poor students. Additionally, access to free meals increases participation in school lunch by
roughly 11 percent for non-poor students and 5.4 percent for poor students.
Multiple papers use the Community Eligibility Provision (CEP) and a schools choice to par-
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ticipate in it and offer their student body universal free meals. Comperatore and Fuller [2018] use
school data from North Carolina and estimate a difference-in-differences model between eligible
participating and non-participating schools using administrative student-level data. They find uni-
versal meals reduce absences, improve test scores, and do not affect disciplinary outcomes. Kho
[2018] looked at how CEP effects suspensions, attendance, and expulsions in Tennessee. These
findings showed that CEP reduced suspensions about 10 percent and increased access to free school
meals by 50 percent. In addition, they were able to examine a year-by-year analysis that showed
that the effects of CEP on student educational outcomes grew over time, with more positive effects
on on-time grade progression and behavioral outcomes in future years of implementation. Davis
and Musaddiq [2018] looked at k-12 schools in Georgia and used CEP eligibility as an instrument
for CEP participation and find that CEP participation increases the percentage of a schools students
who fall within a healthy weight range and reduces school-level average BMI scores.
Lastly, (Gordon and Ruffini [2018] and Altindag et al. [2020]) specifically explore behavioral
outcomes among schools that offer free meals. Both papers conclude that universal school meal
programs reduce student conflict. Gordon and Ruffini [2018] focus on suspension rates in schools
but, as mentioned in their research, not the reasons attributed to these suspensions. Their study
relies on the timing of pilot implementation of CEP across states to examine how disciplinary
infractions evolve within a school as it adopts CEP. They find modest reductions in suspension
rates among elementary and middle but not high school students. Altindag et al. [2020] looked at
bullying and fights in South Korean schools over a four year time span. They find that the provision
of universal school lunches reduces the number of behavioral incidents, particularly physical fights
between students, by about 35 percent. They attest that the reduction could be observed because
universal free meal programs reduces the chances that a students socioeconomic status can be
identified, and therefore fights and bullying that are motivated by a bias towards the wealthy or
poor students are reduced.
We add to the existing literature because we have access to student-level data on a broader range
of outcomes. These outcomes include total school discipline reports, truancy, substance abuse, in-
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class disruptions, and weapon abuse. We also investigate both the average treatment effect, through
the use of a difference in differences approach, as well as the local average treatment effect, through
the use of a regression discontinuity design. We also tie together both academic performance and
behavior into one combined analysis when schools participate in free meal programs. Specifically,
we are able to determine whether there exists a strong link between the overall impact of free meal
programs on cognitive, behavioral, and academic performance.
1.1.1 School Feeding in Texas
Currently, the reimbursement rates for the 2019-2020 school year in Texas are $0.31 for paid
breakfasts, $1.54 for reduced breakfasts, and $1.84 for free breakfasts. Additionally, a school may
qualify and apply for Severe Need Breakfast reimbursement, i.e., an additional $0.36 on top of
the regular breakfast reimbursement for reduced and free meals served. To be granted the extra
funding, at least 40 percent of the total lunches served in the school year must have been free
or reduced. To receive reimbursements for meals, schools are required to send home paperwork
with the students that parents can fill out to determine whether they qualify for reduced-price or
free meals. Once the forms are returned, they are then verified by a certified person in the district
or school. Additionally, schools can file under the Community Eligibility Provision (CEP) and
Special Assistance Provision 2 (P2). These are two alternate ways to the standard requirements
for determining the eligibility and claiming reimbursement for the National School Lunch Pro-
gram (NLSP) and School Breakfast Program (SBP). The rationale behind using these alternative
approaches to determine how many students qualify for subsidized meals is that these approaches
involve less paperwork than the standard approach. Both options reduce the paperwork sent home
and eliminate the verification process. They are able to achieve this by utilizing the school’s claim-
ing percentages based on the number of students identified for reimbursement in the school. An
identified student is one that participates in other need-based programs such as Supplemental Nutri-
tional Assistance Program (SNAP), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), and Food
Distribution Program on Indian Reservations (FDPIR) or is categorically eligible (including Foster,
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Migrant, Head Start, and Runaway children) (USDA [2019]). Under these alternative provisions,
schools are reimbursed based on the percentage of identified students multiplied by 1.6 to deter-
mine the total percentage of meals reimbursed at the Federal free rate. One restriction is that the
percentage derived from the calculation cannot exceed 100 percent. The remaining percentage of
meals is reimbursed at the Federal paid rate. Once schools have their claiming percentages, they
multiply them by the total number of breakfasts and lunches served to determine the number of
meals claimed at the Federal free, reduced, and paid rates (USDA).
The main difference between UFB and a standard breakfast program (SBP) is that UFB offers
breakfast at no charge to all students, irrespective of their household income. Breakfast is given
free to any student who wants it that day and the school files for the Federal reimbursement at the
correct income category for that student. In terms of nutrition standards, there is no difference
in nutrition standards between UFB and SBP. There is also very little within district variation
in the breakfast offered at the different schools, eliminating the possible bias of UFB or SBP
schools offering different nutritional quality via different breakfast. The data also shows schools
that always participate in UFB or schools that ever participate served more lunches and breakfast
than schools that never participate in UFB.3 Tables 1.1 and 1.2 show the summary statistics for
the number of free, reduced, and full paid lunches and breakfast for the three types of schools. As
they both show, always and ever-participating UFB schools give out almost two and three times
the number of breakfast as schools that never participated in UFB, respectively. One contributing
factor is that UFB helps reduce the stigma attached to eating breakfast at school and provides
breakfast for those students who cannot afford the cost of breakfast. It also now allowed students
that were just above to cutoff the have breakfast cost free (Schwartz and Rothbart [2020]). Lastly,
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 show the free and reduced served rates and eligible rates. The eligible rate is the
total number of free and reduced price eligible students divided by the student population for that
school, where the served rate is the number of free and reduced priced lunches/breakfasts served
divided by the total number of lunches/breakfasts served. The served rate is higher than the eligible
rate for all three types of schools (never, always, and ever-participating schools), indicating that
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more students from low-income families rely on the school for food than those from higher-income
families. More striking is the difference in breakfast served and eligible rates. Again, all three
types of schools show a higher served rate than eligible rate, but both ever and never participating
schools had served rates of over 84 percent. This helps support the notion that low-income students
primarily depend on school breakfast as their main meal in the morning, while higher-income
students do not. Most recently, during the social distancing and stay-at-home orders implemented
by most US states, the USDA came out with the SFSP/SSO COVID-19 waiver. This waiver stated
that schools with a free and reduced rate of 50 percent or higher may develop meal distribution
methods in which meals are available to all families with children enrolled in that school, with
a focus on serving low-income children. For dismissed schools with less than 50 percent free or
reduced price enrollment, meal distribution methods must more directly target the households of
enrolled children who are eligible for free or reduced price meals (Porter [2020], USDA [2020],
VOX [2020]). This swift waiver and support shows that there is a great need to provide meals to
students, specifically students of low-income families. (recommended to insert Tables 1.1 and 1.2
here).
Some individuals might have a concern about sample selection, certain types of schools choos-
ing to opt for UFB, and omitted variable bias, such as other programs that were implemented
during the sample years that also targeted conflict in schools. With regard to sample selection,
one would think that richer schools would be more likely to participate because they can af-
ford to, but the competing force that pushes against them is that richer schools are less likely
to rely on the school for student meals and would not want any negative stigma that might be
associated with UFB participation. Referring back to Tables 1.1 and 1.2, the free and reduced
meal served rates for all three types of UFB schools was higher than that of the actual eligible
rate, showing that lower-income students depend more on schools for their meals than do higher-
income students. In addition to that, Table 1.4 shows school-level demographics and discipline
averages for never-participating, ever-participating, and always-participating schools. Both the
ever-participating and always-participating have averages for all variables that are close to each
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other. The never-participating averages are slightly lower for all the discipline groups except for
truancy and substance abuse. They also have slightly lower demographic averages for the schools’
free and reduced lunch rate and bilingual rate, but a much higher Asian rate and graduation rate.
To mitigate any possible bias, we follow the same approach as Gordon and Ruffini [2018] and in
the main analysis excluded schools that never participate from the regression analysis. We instead
focus on schools that always participate and schools that ever participate in UFB by school year
2016/2017. Lastly, we also contacted TEA’s Department of Programs and Reporting, and asked
them to check if there were any state-wide programs that were also being rolled out during the
sample years that specifically targeted conflict. They confirmed there were not.
1.2 Data
This paper uses two unique data sets. The first comes from the Texas Department of Agricul-
ture. It tracks all schools in the state of Texas that participate in UFB and schools that participate
in an SBP. The data spans from school years 2011/2012-2016/2107. The UFB to non-UFB par-
ticipation ratio of schools averaged 27.3 percent throughout the sample period. The second data
set, acquired from the Texas Education Administration (TEA), contains annual school-level disci-
plinary reports, school-level meets or exceeds passing rates, and school-level characteristics and
demographics. The discipline data reports detailed numbers over total counts of students and ac-
tions (incidences) by discipline action groups and discipline action reasons. This data represents
the highest level of detail the state records. In total, there are over 50 different categories that a
discipline action can fall into. Because of the large number of different categories, we grouped
similar action reasons into subgroups.4 Action reason 21, Code of Conduct violation, accounted
for 31 percent of the total conflict reports. Due to federal and state privacy regulations, some of
the data came masked. If data was masked, it was because the reported actions for that school fell
between 1 and 9.5
To overcome the masked data problem, we looked at four different options. First, replace
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all the masked data with the lowest bound of 1; second, replace masked data with 5 the middle
number on the scale; third, replace it with 9 the highest bound of the masked data; lastly, drop all
masked data. To pick the best option, we ran equation 1 on all 4 different options and the point
estimates for the low parameter and dropping all masked data were almost identical, -0.182 and -
0.189, respectively. The middle and high parameter were both also nearly identical with each being
-0.166 and -0.161, respectively. Because the point estimates were all close, the models are all run
with the middle bound, replacing the masked data with 5.6 This would allow for the analysis to not
omit the masked data and represent the middle bound of the possibilities that the masked data could
be. The complete summary statistics of conflict, test, and school demographics data is presented
in Table 1.3. Lastly, the discipline data was reported in a manner such that if a school reports
0 for a type of discipline it meant that there were no reported incidents of that discipline action.
Therefore, taking the log of zero will cause it to be dropped in the regression. To overcome this,
we used the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) of the reported conflict rather than the more traditional
log of conflict. Estimated coefficients can be interpreted in the same way as with a log transformed
dependent variable but, unlike with the log of conflict, IHS is defined for zero data points.7 The
IHS is defined as log(Yit(1+Y 2it )
0.5, where Yit is the conflict report for school i during time t. (See
Burbidge et al. [1988]).
Testing data was acquired from each school’s Texas Academic Performance Report (TAPR).
This report contains each schools TAKS or STAAR results which reported the percentage of stu-
dents that meets or exceeds the states passing standard. Before spring of 2012 the states stan-
dardized test was the TAKS test (Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills). The STAAR test
(State of Texas Assessments of Academic Readiness) replaced the TAKS test and each year post
implementation the meets or exceeds standard increased. The performance section of the TAPR
shows STAAR/TAKS performance by grade, subject, and performance level.8 Following past lit-
erature, we standardized the passing rates by taking the standard score, also know as the z-score
((x-mean)/SD) ,for each school per year and used it as the outcome variable of interest.9 The ad-
vantage of standardizing the scores, especially when the passing rate was increasing from year to
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year, is it allows comparison of scores on different kinds of variables by standardizing the distribu-
tion. A positive z-score means the data value is larger than the mean. If a data value has a z-score
of 2, that tells us that this data value is 2 standard deviations larger than the mean. The same goes
from if the value is negative.
Yearly school level demographics and characteristics were also acquired from TEA. The data
included student body composition, total enrollment, student to teacher ratio, and the graduation
rate for the high schools. Table 1.3 shows the summary statistics for the school-level demographics,
conflict reports, and STAAR/TAKS passing rates for all schools in the sample, as well as by school
type (high school, middle school, and elementary school). Table 1.4 shows the summary statistics
when we break the schools into UFB groups (never-participating, always-participating, and ever-
participating). This additional table helps address concerns over school sample selection into the
program, but as the table shows, there is little difference between the three types. Additionally, the
never-participating schools are omitted from the main specification results. Lastly, in the appendix
there is a visual representation of the location of each school in the state, colored by the schools
UFB group.10 Lastly, county-level wages and employment data was acquired from the Bureau of
Labor Statics. (Recommended to insert Tables 1.3 and 1.4 about here)
1.3 Methodology
1.3.1 Test Scores
The preferred estimation strategy compares changes in academic performance and various dis-
cipline reports within ever-participating and always-participating universal free breakfast schools.
Ever-participating schools are schools that have at one point adopted UFB in the sample period.
Always-participating schools are schools that always participate. By focusing on just the two types
of schools in the main analysis, we are able to estimate the effect of universal free breakfast without
concern for eligibility with the decision to participate.
For comparative purposes, we start off by first exploring the following fixed-effects model to
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explore the relationship between UFB and a schools’ meets or exceeds passing rate and discipline
reports:
Yit=β1UFBit + β2AWCit + β3AECit + β4Xit + δd + σt + εit (1.1)
Where Yit is the z-score of students that meet or exceed standards on the state test, for school
i during year t, β1 is the coefficient for UFB Indicator which equals one if the school in year t
participated in the UFB program, β2 is the coefficient for county annual wage, β3 is the coefficient
the county annual employee, β4 is the coefficient for the set of control variables for school i at time
t,11 δd is the district fixed effects, and σt is year fixed effects. Analyzing academic performance and
UFB participation is useful but is not the main specification or analysis of this paper. Numerous
past research has already contributed to this topic, but it is useful in our analysis to better link how
participation in UFB effects both academic progress and discipline actions.
1.3.2 Conflict in Schools
Equation 1 is also used as the initial analysis on UFB participation and discipline actions. Each
one of the discipline groups was used as the outcome variable to see how overall discipline was
affected and how individual discipline actions were affected. The FE model is useful for causal
inference because it controls for all fixed characteristics, both observed and unobserved, that may
confound the estimate of the effect of discipline on UFB participation.
Fixed effects models use within-unit changes over time to estimate the causal effect, with units
serving as their own controls. If time-varying confounding remains a concern, an external control
group may help provide a counterfactual for what would have happened to the units with exposure
changes in the absence of that change. To overcome this limitation the use of a DID design utilizes
policy changes rather than time-invariant policies that differ across jurisdictions. By controlling
for all fixed differences between schools and shared changes over time, the DID model focuses
on changes in the exposure of interest that occur in some schools but not others and can thereby
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estimate the unbiased causal effect of the exposure. Specifically, we estimate equation (2) as:
Yit=β1(UFBi ∗ Participateit) + β2AWCit + β3AECit + β4Xit + δd + σt + εit (1.2)
Where Yit is one of the discipline outcomes for school i during year t, β1 is the coefficient
for UFB non-time varying variable that equals one if a school participates in UFB by 2017.
Participateit equals one each year a school participates in UFB. The measure of interest is the in-
teraction of these terms, which equals one if a school that participates in UFB at any point through
2017 participates in year t. β2 is the coefficient for county annual wage, β3 is the coefficient the
county annual employee, β4 is the coefficient for the set of school level control variables for school
i at time t,12 we include district fixed effects, δd, to account for time-invariant district factors, as
well as year fixed effects, σt, to account for temporal trends in discipline, and temporal changes
due to and state advocacy, media, and any policy that is affecting all schools at the same time. This
approach is most similar to that used in papers that analyze changes within a state stemming from
universal meal program (Comperatore and Fuller [2018], Kho [2018], Gordon and Ruffini [2018]).
Lastly, effective September 1, 2013, the Senate Bill 376 (83rd Texas Legislative Session) was
passed that requires all schools (contracting entities (CEs)) with 80 percent or more free/reduced-
price meal eligible students to participate in UFB (Legislature Of The State Of Texas [2013]). The
passage of this Bill allowed for the use of a regression discontinuity design. Specifically, a fuzzy
regression discontinuity (FRD) because there are schools that are below the 80% cutoff that also
participate in UFB. FRD estimates local average treatment effects around the cutoff point, where
treatment schools and control schools are most similar and provides useful evidence on whether a
program, such as UFB, should be cut or expanded at the margin. The FRD is not used as the main
specification of choice because the FRD estimates the local average treatment effects around the
cutoff point, the estimate does not necessarily apply to schools with free and reduced rates further
away from the cutoff point. Combining the FRD and DID results is key for the goal of this paper,
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to see not only if schools should adopt UFB, the average treatment effect, but also if it should be
expanded, the local average treatment effect. Figure 3 graphically shows the discontinuity in UFB
participation between the schools above and below the cutoff both before and after the bill was
passed.13 Both before and after the Bill was passed, one can see the same general trend below the
cutoff. Before the Bill was passed, UFB participation peaked at about the 80 percent free/reduced
mark and then gradually fell. This is in sharp contrast to the situation observed after the bill
was passed, with 100 percent UFB participation after the cutoff point. The bottom graph shows
the discontinuity around the 80 percent free/reduced mark, but now with total school conflict as
the outcome variable. The window was restricted to just schools that had a free/reduced rate of 60
percent and higher, but as it shows because schools are forced to opt into UFB after 80 percent they
also have lower conflict than schools that are right before the cutoff. Because of this, we are able
to identify the causal effect through an FRD design, where the threshold serves as the instrument
for participation in the program (Lehmann and Matarazzo [2019]). The first and second stage
regressions are as follows:
ÛFBIit=β1FreeReducedRateit + β2AWCit + β3AECit + β4Xit + δd + σt + εit (1.3)
and
Yit=α + β1ÛFBIit + β2AWCit + β3AECit + β4Xit + δd + σt + εit (1.4)
Where in the first stage of the regression, UFB is the outcome and the school’s free and reduced
rate is the instrument. All the same controls are used in equations 4 and 5 as were used and
described in equation 1. In the second stage the results for ÛFBIit are used and the outcome
variable is total school conflict. (Recommended to insert figure 3 here)
We closely follow the empirical approaches that Calonico et al. [2014, 2015] have detailed
in their research. We followed Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2015) to find the optimal data-
driven RD bandwidth selection by calculating the number of bins based on the mimicking-variance
quantile-spaced method using polynomial regression. This approach allowed for the variability
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of the local sample means to change across bins only due to non-constant conditional variances
(because of to the presence of heteroscedasticity), but not due to different sample sizes in each bin,
like in other bin selection methods. The mimicking variability picks the number of bins so that
the binned sample means have an integrated (asymptotic) variability closely equal to the amount
of variability of the raw data. Specifically, we can allow V− and V+ represent the variance of the
outcome variables (Total School Conflict) for control (schools with free/reduced meals under 80
percent and not participating in UFB) and treatment units (schools over 80 percent). Thus, the




This allows for the number of bins for each group’s mean to have approximately the same
asymptotic variability in the QS-based local sample, equal to the overall variability of the data.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Test Scores
As a first pass, we look at all students’ combined and math test z-scores. The z-score for
each school was used as the outcome variable of choice because it allows comparison of scores
on different kinds of variables by standardizing the distribution. Results for the estimation of
Equation 1 are presented in Table 1.5. Columns 1 and 2 show the z-score for all tests and math
test, respectively. Schools that participated in UFB show higher z-scores by 0.049 and 0.059,
respectively. The value of the z-score tells you how many standard deviations you are away from
the mean. This means if the z-score is equal to 0, it is on the mean. Whereas, a positive z-score
indicates the raw score is higher than the mean average. In the case for schools that participated in
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UFB they have a z-score that is 0.049 standard deviations above the mean for all tests and 0.059
standard deviations above the mean for math tests.
Next, columns 3, 4 show the same results, but focusing only on high school. The results show
that high schools actually experience a higher return from participation in UFB. For high school,
the combined test z-scores was by .135 standard deviations above the mean, and math only test
z-scores were by .16 standard deviations above the mean.
These results are very promising, especially the high school results that show a large return on
participation. They also align with the results of other researchers such as Dotter [2013], Ruffini
[2018], and Frisvold [2015]. As promising as these results are, the main analysis and purpose
of this paper was to examine discipline outcomes and link those results to the already abundant
literature over academic outcomes. This will have the potential for policy makers and school
leaders to have a more robust picture of the overall benefits of UFB for their and student body.
(Recommended to insert Table 1.5 here)
1.4.2 School Discipline Fixed Effects Results
As discussed previously, we know that cognitive, behavioral, and academic outcomes are in-
terdependent. An increase in a schools’ meets or exceeds percentage does not solve the puzzle. It
instead suggests a deeper probe that looks at school-level discipline would help further round out
the analysis. As previously discussed, some of the schools might have reported 0 for a specific
discipline outcome, such as truancy or substance abuse. Using the natural log of the data would
omit those data points from the analysis. To overcome this, we used the inverse hyperbolic sine
which can be interpreted in exactly the same way as a standard logarithmic dependent variable14
(Burbidge et al. [1988]). As a double check, we also ran the model using both the natural log and
natural log +1 and compared all the outcome. These results are presented in the appendix and the
point estimates for all three were almost identical.
Table 1.6 shows the results for equation 1 for total conflict, as well as the other discipline
groups for all grades and school. Controlling for both school and county level demographics,
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the model shows that there is a 16.6 percent decrease in total discipline reports at a school that
participates in UFB compared to schools that do not. At the mean, an always participating school
has on average 269 total discipline reports a year, and this would be reduced by 45 reports. Once
the outcome variable is switched to one of the more specific discipline groups, we see the same
general reduction for each one, except the placebo test of weapon violation. Under Texas Education
Code of conduct 37.002 (b) “A teacher may remove from class a student who has been documented
by the teacher to repeatedly interfere with the teacher’s ability to communicate effectively with the
students in the class or with the ability of the student’s classmates to learn, or whose behavior the
teacher determines is so unruly, disruptive, or abusive that it seriously interferes with the teacher’s
ability to communicate effectively with the students in the class or with the ability of the student’s
classmates to learn.” (Agency [2019]). Using equation 1, code of conduct reports are reduced by
16.1 percent. This reduction in common classroom disruptions is not only economically significant
and highly meaningful, but also meaningful in direct and indirect ways. Directly, participating
schools on average will see yearly total code of conduct violations decrease from 241 to 202.
Indirectly participating schools will see positive spillovers through an overall enhancement in the
classroom environment, leading to a more positive learning environment for all students. This can
help us link back to the increase in test results that we saw in the previous section.
The substance abuse categories includes any conflict report for alcohol, tobacco, or any con-
trolled substance. Column 3 of Table 1.6 shows that participating schools experience a reduction
in substance abuse by 12.2 percent. The driving force behind this result can come from many
different directions. One might think that being hungry is the driving factor for kids to substitute
food with tobacco/drugs. Mineur et al. [2011] from Yale and the Baylor College of medicine,
found that smoking decreases appetite, and smokers often report that they smoke to control their
weight. Singh [2014] showed how there is a complex relationship between food and mood; that,
with a lack of proper nutrition your mood is negatively impacted. Research from a number of
organizations, including APA and Alcoholics Anonymous, have recognized that issues with irrita-
tion and the expression of more negative/depressed moods and trying to managing anger can lead
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to an exacerbation of substance abuse. Given this linkage, another plausible explanation is that
students now are getting better/more proper nutrition in the mornings, which results in them being
less irritated, moody, or on edge and not reaching out to tobacco/drugs.
In Texas, truancy is reported for students that are in the age range of 12-18 years with 10 or
more unexcused absences per semester or failure to attend school because they failed to enroll.
As column 4 of Table 1.6 shows, participating schools saw a reduction in truancy of 22.1 percent.
The question arising here is why are these truant students coming to school more? First, as noted
earlier, UFB reduces the negative stigma that is associated with being on the free/reduced meal
plan. There is no longer the negative social aspect related to breakfast and students are more
willing to come to school and eat. As they have better access to regular nutrition, they are gaining
more classroom learning time, as well as not acting out as much, in turn leading to an increase in
test scores. Another benefit from an increase in student attendance is the increase in school funding
that participating schools receive because most schools receive some part of their funding based
on the number of students that attend school daily. The average student misses about 2-3 days a
semester (Garcı́a and Weiss [2018]), but truancy kicks in on the 10th absent days per semester.
The state of Texas pays each school $45 a day for each student they have in attendance. Also, the
mean truancy rate across all high schools that do not participate in UFB is 62. When these schools
participate in UFB, truancy drops by 22.1 percent; in other words, a reduction by 13-14 reports.
This decrease in truancy could generate a school an additional $5, 000 to $8, 000 in attendance
revenue.15 Lastly, the students that are constantly absent for unexcused reasons are highly likely
to be the same students that care the least about school attendance, cause classroom disruptions,
or fall on the lower end of the socioeconomic ladder and would benefit the most from more focus
on their education. A final implicit spillover from increasing attendance would be, with all other
factors kept constant, that the conflict rates per student would decrease. This is a common statistic
that schools are evaluated on.
Fighting in schools never ends well for either party involved. It is one of the more serious
conflicts a student can engaged in. Some fighting might be premeditated, but for many fights,
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teachers report that they come out of nowhere and the people involved seemed to be off that day.
This can be circled back to the fact that being hungry causes an individual’s mood to be highly
sensitive to swings, resulting in students acting on aggression for insignificant reasons. As column
5 of Table 1.6 shows, participating schools saw a reduction in fighting by 13.5 percent, or on
the mean, a reduction from 32 reported fights per year to 28. These results show the cognitive,
behavioral, and academic benefits of regular access to nutrition for our youth.
There were some actions that did not fit into well-defined categories such as substance abuse,
fighting, or truancy, so we grouped them under the “Other” sub-category. Examples that fall under
this category include terrorism threats, arson, title 5 felony off-campus, and sexual assault. All of
these conflict outcomes are very serious actions. Individually, each one of these conflict reports
account for a small proportion of the total conflict number, but once they are all grouped together,
there was enough data points for the model to work. As Table 1.6 shows, there was a significant
decrease in the return to UFB participation, a decrease of 10.5 percent.
So far, we have seen significant reductions in all the conflict categories, but the one that showed
no significant change was the category of weapon violations. These conflict reports were written
for students that brought knifes, firearms, and other prohibited weapons to school. Generally, these
violations require more planning. If a student is going to bring a weapon to school, they need to
make that choice before they come, so simply eating breakfast should not have an effect here. That
is exactly what the results show. This observation was not needed, but it was a good robustness
check to determine whether the link between food and academic/behavioral was clean.
(Recommended to insert Table 1.6 about here)
1.4.3 Difference in Differences Results
Equation 2, the DID model, is the specification of choice because it focuses on changes in the
exposure of interest that occur in some schools but not others and can thereby estimate the unbiased
causal effect of the exposure. Following Gordon and Ruffini [2018], the never-participating schools
were omitted and only schools that would participate in UFB by the end of school year 2016/2017
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were kept. Table 1.7 presents the results of equation 2 and the same trend from the fixed effects
model are present. Here, we see that total yearly school level discipline reports are reduced by
17.1 percent for schools that participate in UFB compared to schools that had not yet participated.
This indicates at the mean, total discipline reports would be reduced from 268 to 222, a reduction
of 46 reports. Code of Conduct violations decrease by 16.6 percent, and substance abuse reports
decrease by 12.1 percent. Truancy reports decrease by 23.5 percent; which is close to the same
point estimates that Leos-Urbel et al. [2013] found when they looked at schools in New York City.
Fighting reports also decreased by 14 percent, an increase in point estimate from the fix effects
model and is similar to what Altindag et al. [2020] found in their study.
This subsection specifically looks at the results of Equation (2) and discipline at the high school
level. High school analysis and behavioral analysis is an area that is missing in the past research
that typically focuses on elementary and middle school students. In addition, Sepe [2009] in her
report to the Maryland Department of Education found that skipping breakfast increased with age
and high school students are more likely to skip breakfast compared to middle and elementary
students. Sweeney and Horishita [2005] found that 57 percent of inner-city high school students
reported skipping breakfast because of a lack of time or the negative stigma associated with meal
programs at school. High school students may also by more involved in extra-curricular activities,
such as sports, bands, choirs, and other that require more fuel for the body to perform efficiently.
Given these facts, schools that offer UFB have the potential to increase student meal participation
and at the same time possibly reduce discipline reports. Table 1.8 reports the results of this analysis.
Schools that adopt UFB see total discipline reports decrease by 12.8 percent and code of conduct
reports by 13.5 percent. We believe all of the possible channels that were discussed in the previous
sections are evident here, as well as when focusing on just high schools. Additionally, column
3 (Substance Abuse), 4 (Truancy), and 5 (Fighting) also see a decrease at the high school level
and the point estimates are closely matched with the ones in Table 1.6. Lastly, a reduction in
both overall and classroom disruptions can only positively benefit the learning environment for
the same reasons as discussed in the past section. This benefit comes at a critical time when high
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school students are preparing for post-secondary choices or to join the labor market.
1.4.4 Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design Results
The passage of Senate Bill 376 allowed for an FRD to be estimated. The FRD design was used
to help supplement the DID results, as well as to provide insight into the local average treatment
effect. The running variable is the school’s free and reduced meal rates. If a school’s free and
reduced meal rate is 80 percent or more, then they are required to implement UFB. As mentioned
earlier, because schools can opt for UFB without being at or above the 80 percent cutoff, this
restricts the use of a sharp RD and for the use of the fuzzy RD.16 Following past research, the
sample was restricted to just schools that were 20 percent above and below the cutoff point. Figure
3 shows that there is discontinuity at the cut off once the bill was passed when compared to before.
Before the bill was passed, UFB participation peaked around the 80 percent free/reduced mark.
After the bill was passed, you see a clear discontinuity and jump to 100 percent UFB participation
after the cutoff. This results in the bottom graph, where it shows again the 80 percent free/reduced
cutoff. Now, with total school conflict as the outcome variable, schools right after the cutoff and
up to about 95 percent have lower total school conflict than one that are just before the cutoff.
Empirically, results from equations 3 and 4 are presented in Table 1.9. The first column presents
the first-stage regression results when UFB is the outcome variable and the variable of interest on
the right-hand side is the school’s free and reduced rate. This is highly significant with the first
stage F-stat is over 900 with a particle R-squared of 0.325. Both of these support the notion that
it is highly unlikely that the results are driven by a weak instrument. Column 2 shows the second-
stage regression results. Once UFB is instrumented, we see that there is a significant reduction in
total conflict by 13.1 percent. This shows that the local average treatment effect is 13.1 percent
lower because schools after the cutoff are forced to offer UFB when compared to schools just
before the cutoff. As mentioned previously, the DID shows the average treatment effect; if schools
should adopt UFB. The FRD shows the local average treatment effect, indicating if UFB should be
expanded. Given that both models showed reductions in total conflict helps give clear evidence that
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there is a positive effect to adopting UFB. Lastly, according to Nathaniel Hendren and Ben Sprung-
Keyser from Harvard University, investment in low-income children’s health and education have
historically had the highest return and have paid for themselves as governments have recouped the
initial cost of their expenses through additional tax revenue collected and reduced transfers and
transfer payments. (Hendren et al. [2019])
1.5 Conclusion
Food insecurity plagues roughly 13 million children around the world and in the US. Roughly
1 out of every 6 live in houses without sufficient access to food. In Texas, this ratio is 1 in 5
(USDA [2019]). In light of this trend, rates of food insecurity are noticeably higher than the
national average among households whose incomes are near or below the Federal poverty line. In
particular, among Black, Hispanic, and single-parent households. The children of these households
would benefit the most from having regular access to nutrition coming in a manner that is free of
stigma. This research gives policy-makers and politicians a new set of results that highlight a cost
effective policy option to help increase cognitive, behavioral, and academic performance as well
as bridge the education attainment gap. This is critical, as the gap is a large driver of the wage gap.
We investigated the relationship between a schools’ “meets or exceeds” standards, numerous
discipline outcomes, and whether or not schools participated in a standard breakfast program or
universal free breakfast program. We analyzed both the average treatment effect and the local
average average treatment effect. Analyzing both effects allowed us to strongly contribute to the
literature and build a better analysis over free meal programs. The results from both the DID
model (average treatment effect) and the FRD model (local average treatment affect), both show
that when schools adopt UFB, they can have both direct and indirect positive benefits. One direct
benefit includes students having increased access to meals. This is most notable for students that
were just above the qualifying level for meal assistance, resulting in overall increases in their
mental and physical health. Other direct benefits come from the reduction in discipline reports and
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increases in academic performance. Specifically, with the reduction in truancy, schools will see an
increase in state funding from the increase in attendance. With an increase in attendance, schools
will receive funding they can use for other programs throughout their school. Indirectly, students
that are already consuming a regular breakfast gain from positive spillovers. Benefits come in the
form of a better classroom environment, given that code of conduct violations are reduced by 16.6
percent. Better classroom environments can help lead to more quality instruction time. Outside of
the classroom, the overall environment of the school is better with a reduction in total discipline
reports. Less truancy, substance abuse, or code of conduct violations can help make the school a
safer and better place for all if its students, teachers, and staff.
Authors’ Notes
Opinions expressed in this essay are solely our own responsibility and do not reflect the view
of any agency and any errors are ours.
Acknowledgments
Special thanks to Greg Burge, Daniel Hicks, and Pallab Ghosh at the University of Oklahoma
for the guidance and recommendations to help make this research possible. Also to the Texas
Education Agency and the Texas Department of Agriculture for the data.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,authorship,
and/or publication of this article.
26
Funding




1A complete list the conflict outcomes is reported in the appendix.
2 We performed a regression discontinuity and used each school’s free/reduced rate as the running variable. The
RD plot and results are presented in section 5.
3Ever-participating schools are schools that switch out and in to the UFB program throughout the sample years,
always-participating schools are schools that always participate in the UFB program, and never-participating schools
are schools that never participate in the UFB program.
4 The complete breakdown of what action reason fell into each group is presented in Figure A1 in the appendix
section of the paper.
5 A majority of the masked data was from smaller schools or fell into the serious violations group that happen
very infrequently. This group includes reports such as terrorism threat, arson, title 5 felony off campus, and aggravated
kidnapping.
6Table A1 with regression results for the fixed effect model are presented in the appendix that shows the complete
results for each bound.
7Table A3 in the appendix shows the comparison for the IHS, natural log, and natural log plus 1, and all points
estimates are nearly identical.
8 Included in the report was the passing rates for grade 3 (reading and mathematics), grade 4 (reading, mathemat-
ics, and writing), grade 5 (reading, mathematics, and science), grade 6 (reading and mathematics), grade 7 (reading,
mathematics, and writing), grade 8 (reading, mathematics, science, and social studies). It also included End-of-Course
(EOC) test for the following high school classes: English I, English II, Algebra I, Biology, and U.S. History.
9 The STAAR test was first introduced in the 2011/2012 school year. Before STARR, the state of Texas was under
the TAKS test. Because of the changing passing rate and switch in test, the ranking system and z-score were used
instead of the raw passing rate to account for the changes.
10 On average, there were about 8,744 schools per year in the sample.
11 Control variables include Total Students, Black, Asian, Hispanic rates, and the Free lunch rate.
12 Control variables in the DiD model are the same that were used in the FE model.
13Table A2 in the appendix shows the UFB participation rate for every 10th free/reduced percentile and what share
of the total schools they account for.
14The inverse hyperbolic sine transformation is defined as log(Yi + (Y2i + 1)
1/2
15 A complete payoff matrix is included in Table A4 in the appendix.
16 Refer to Figure 3 to see the discontinuity at the cutoff point.
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Tables
Table 1.1: Average Lunch Counts By UFB Group
Lunch Total Lunch Served Free Lunch Served Reduced Lunch Served Paid F-R Served Rate F-R Eligible Rate
Never UFB
mean 43,983.97 23,613.1 2,876.831 17,494.04 .598 .427
sd 40,638.18 33,212.19 3,593.853 20,084.84 .324 .320
Always UFB
mean 63,923.12 46,493.6 5,824.945 11,604.57 .810 .723
sd 48,743.72 38,067.84 5,342.588 11,542.37 .151 .193
Mixed UFB
mean 70,504.55 48,935.46 4,980.639 16,588.45 .735 .642
sd 47,836.8 40,433.77 4,751.928 17,758.13 .216 .258
Summary table shows the average lunches served per year for each for each of the 3 types of student categories by a schools UFB group. Never UFB are schools
that never implemented UFB throughout the sample. Always UFB are schools that were always on UFB, and Mixed are schools that opt in/out of UFB throughout
the sample. F-R Served Rate stands for the ratio of lunches served Free-Reduced to total lunches served. This is different than the F-R Eligible Rate which is the
ratio of the total number of students eligible for free and reduced meals compared to the total student body for a school. The difference between the two rates
shows that more students that come from higher income families bring lunch to school. If a school is over 80% they are required to participate in UFB, but this
law was not passed till 2015.
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Table 1.2: Average Breakfast Counts By UFB Group
Breakfast Total Breakfast Served Free Breakfast Served Reduced Breakfast Served Paid F-R Served Rate F-R Eligible Rate
Never UFB
mean 17,332.08 13,636.23 984.8665 2,710.986 .843 .472
sd 28,188.8 25,685.3 1,430.194 4,052.773 .324 .320
Always UFB
mean 48,773.28 33,248.22 4,310.84 11,214.23 .770 .723
sd 35,076.74 25,531.98 3,926.12 11,917.25 .151 .193
Mixed UFB
mean 37,963.05 30,812.25 2,230.025 4,920.778 .870 .642
sd 35,986.56 32,241.23 2,499.212 5,890.489 .216 .258
Summary table shows the average breakfast’s served per year for each for each of the 3 types of student categories by a schools UFB group. Never UFB are schools that never
implemented UFB throughout the sample. Always UFB are schools that were always on UFB, and Mixed are schools that opt in/out of UFB throughout the sample. F-R Served
Rate stands for the ratio of breakfasts served Free-Reduced to total breakfasts served. This is different than the F-R Eligible Rate which is the ratio of the total number of students
eligible for free and reduced meals compared to the total student body for a school. The difference between the two rates shows that more students that come from higher income
families bring lunch to school. It also shows that more low income students depend on school breakfasts as their morning meal and higher income students eat at home. If a
school is over 80% they are required to participate in UFB, but this law was not passed till 2015.
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Table 1.3: School Demographics and STAAR Rates
All Schools High School Middle School Elementry School
Mean Mean Mean Mean
SD SD SD SD
UFB Rate 0.535 0.513 0.505 0.551
(0.382) (0.394) (0.349) (0.386)
Observations 78,695 19,203 14,277 45,215
STAAR Passing Rates Mean Mean Mean Mean
SD SD SD SD
N N N N
Combined Tests 55.60 50.35 54.89 57.82
(14.25) (13.96) (13.65) (14.25)
(44,275) (9,605) (9,029) (25,641)
Math 56.76 46.83 58.87 59.82
(17.25) (18.62) (17.35) (15.65)
(38,126) (8,358) (8,471) (21,297)
Reading 56.06 53.87 54.58 57.15
(13.62) (13.92) (12.82) (13.69)
(41,541) (7,275) (8,935) (25,331)
Writing 44.93 50.74 46.50 43.26
(16.14) (17.22) (16.93) (15.23)
(9,360) (671) (3,265) (5,424)
School Demographics Mean Mean Mean Mean
SD SD SD SD
Total Students 588.98 634.04 632.64 557.98
(464.82) (783.72) (373.96) (268.52)
FTE Total 40.39 48.81 43.78 36.18
(28.46) (49.25) (21.80) (15.32)
Teacher Student Ratio 14.44 12.43 14.24 15.24
(12.35) (18.03) (2.85) (10.83)
Black Rate 13.50 14.629 12.61 13.25
(17.55) (18.88) (16.39) (17.30)
Hispanic Rate 50.87 48.31 47.90 52.60
(29.84) (29.88) (29.80) (29.76)
White Rate 30.93 33.0 34.82 29.19
(27.35) (28.58) (28.16) (26.52)
Asian Rate 2.79 2.39 2.78 2.96
(6.06) (5.81) (5.38) (6.36)
Free Lunch Rate 63.43 58.95 59.48 66.19
(28.52) (25.15) (25.20) (25.84)
Bilingual Rate 17.43 9.36 10.50 22.23
(19.26) (14.34) (12.77) (20.61)
Observations 78,695 19,203 14,277 45,215
School Discipline Reports Mean Mean Mean Mean
SD SD SD SD
Total 70.68 132.89 214.34 31.45
(306.30) (476.49) (464.60) (172.71)
Code of Conduct 9.40 5.33 22.14 9.08
(96.61) (23.86) (178.22) (95.64)
Substance Abuse 5.50 7.44 5.12 2.80
(16.63) (21.51) (10.84) (9.13)
Fighting 2.36 2.63 3.66 2.17
(6.91) (10.52) (10.25) (5.45)
Weapon Violation 1.46 1.51 2.23 1.36
(1.76) (1.51) (2.99) (1.60)
Truancy 2.27 4.70 2.87 1.87
(7.25) (17.70) (8.20) (3.43)
Assault 2.27 3.49 3.76 1.97
(4.48) (6.06) (7.41) (2.11)
Serous Violation 3.16 4.95 2.97 1.86
(23.70) (38.75) (8.72) (4.07)
Removal 1.88 1.09 2.58 1.97
(2.67) (1.09) (2.95) (2.88)
UFB Rate is the number of schools in the sample that participate in UFB. The discipline reports are total
school reports. Passing rates are for grades 3 (reading and mathematics), grade 4(reading, mathematics, and
writing), grade 5(reading, mathematics, and science), grade 6(reading and mathematics), grade 7(reading,
mathematics, and writing), grade 8(reading, mathematics,science, and social studies). It also included End-of-
Course (EOC) test for the following high school classes, English I, English II, Algebra I, Biology, and U.S. History.
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Table 1.4: Summary Stats By UFB Group
Conflict Always-Participating Never-Participating Ever-Participating
Mean Mean Mean
SD SD SD
Campus Total 268.31 204.40 265.58
(580.51) (533.25) (541.20)
Conflict Per Person 0.675 0.566 0.451
(2.14) (1.79) (1.29))
Code of Conduct PP 0.517 0.397 0.367
(1.91) (1.56) (1.04)
Fighting PP 0.051 0.050 0.040
(0.145) (0.112) (0.081)
Substance Abuse PP 0.125 0.190 0.061
(0.592) (0.937) (0.287)
Truancy PP 0.069 0.104 0.040
(0.358) (0.274) (0.106)
Observations 12,493 2,726 63,476
School Demographics Mean Mean Mean
SD SD SD
Bilingual Rate 16.66 14.79 16.85
(18.79) (18.11) (19.47)
Black Rate 14.56 14.37 12.42
(18.31) (18.22) (16.14))
Hispanic Rate 53.88 45.10 48.89
(27.28) (29.72) (30.04)
Asian Rate 1.98 5.09 2.85
(4.51) (9.99) (6.18)
American Indian Rate 0.418 0.447 0.435
(1.06) (1.41) (0.861)
Teacher Ratio 14.58 15.16 14.87
(12.22) (9.50) (9.52)
Free Lunch Rate 54.99 48.43 49.19
(22.45) (27.42) (21.59)
Graduation Rate 51.08 72.10 54.98
(49.61) (44.64) (49.37)
Observations 12,493 2,726 63,476
Summary table shows the conflict per person for each sub group and total conflict as well as the average
demographics for each school type. Always-Participating schools are schools that always participate in
UFB over the sample period, never-participating are schools that never do, while the ever-participating
school group are schools that go off and on at least once throughout the sample period.
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Table 1.5: STAAR/TAKS Meets of Exceeds Standards Results
(All Schools) (All Schools) (High Sschol) (High School)
All Tests Math Test All Tests Math Test
UFB 0.049*** 0.059*** 0.135*** 0.160***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.033) (0.036)
Black -0.019*** -0.014*** -0.019*** -0.014***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Asian 0.024*** 0.020*** 0.026*** 0.019***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Hispanic -0.007*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Free Lunch Rate -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.025*** -0.019***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Total Students 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Annual Wage -0.028 -0.188 -0.177 -0.129
(0.169) (0.191) (0.270) (0.336)
Annual Employees 0.752*** 0.547** 0.713** 0.353
(0.190) (0.217) (0.320) (0.396)
Sample Years 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017
School Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Wage and Employment Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 38,908 38,908 9,159 9,159
R-squared 0.411 0.382 0.628 0.546
Results are the z-score for each schools meets or exceeds rate. Each of the control variables
are rates. Year 2012 represents school year 2011/2012, and year 2017 represents school year
2016/2017. So for all the schools the demographics, including free lunch, rates are calculated
and used in the regression. School level demographics such as total students and ethnicity
are controlled for. County level wage and employment is also included on the estimation.
Passing rates are for grades 3 (reading and mathematics), grade 4(reading, mathematics, and
writing), grade 5(reading, mathematics, and science), grade 6(reading and mathematics),
grade 7(reading, mathematics, and writing), grade 8(reading, mathematics,science, and social
studies). It also included End-of-Course (EOC) test for the following high school classes,
English I, English II, Algebra I, Biology, and U.S. History Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 1.6: Fixed Effects Results
(Total Discipline) (Code of Conduct) (Substance) (Truancy) (Fighting) (Weapon) (Other)
UFB -0.166*** -0.161*** -0.122*** -0.221*** -0.135*** 0.007 -0.105***
(0.023) (0.027) (0.024) (0.076) (0.027) (0.015) (0.018)
Total Students 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Black Rate 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.001 0.012*** 0.018*** -0.001* 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Asian Rate -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.011*** 0.001 -0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Hispanic Rate 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.000 0.009*** -0.001*** 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Free/Reduced Lunch Rate 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.011*** 0.008*** -0.000 0.002*** 0.006***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Annual County Wage 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Annual County Employees -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sample Years 12-17 12-17 12-17 12-17 12-17 12-17 12-17
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 53,074 46,536 15,463 3,156 19,095 7,693 19,830
R-squared 0.384 0.356 0.577 0.437 0.360 0.161 0.376
Results are in the IHS (Inverse Hyperbolic Sine), and total students per school is controlled for. Each of the control variables is a rate. For all the schools
the demographics, including free lunch, rates are calculated and used in the regression. School level demographics such as total students and ethnicity
are controlled for. Year 2012 represents school year 2011/2012, and year 2017 represents school year 2016/2017. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 1.7: All Schools Difference in Differences Results
(Total Discipline) (Code of Conduct) (Substance) (Truancy) (Fighting) (Weapon) (Other)
UFB Participation -0.171*** -0.166*** -0.121*** -0.235*** -0.140*** 0.007 -0.108***
(0.023) (0.027) (0.024) (0.077) (0.027) (0.015) (0.018)
Total Students 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Black Rate 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.001 0.012*** 0.018*** -0.001* 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Asian Rate -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.020*** -0.016*** -0.011*** 0.001 -0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Hispanic Rate 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.001 0.009*** -0.001*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Free/Reduced Lunch Rate 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.011*** 0.008*** -0.000 0.002*** 0.006***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Annual County Wage 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Annual County Employees -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sample Years 12-17 12-17 12-17 12-17 12-17 12-17 12-17
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 50,703 44,567 14,902 3,040 18,417 7,474 19,127
R-squared 0.381 0.354 0.580 0.432 0.359 0.164 0.374
Results are in the IHS (Inverse Hyperbolic Sine), and total students per school is controlled for. Each of the control variables is a rate. For all the schools
the demographics, including free lunch, rates are calculated and used in the regression. School level demographics such as total students and ethnicity are
controlled for. Never-Participating schools are excluded from the analysis following the methods of Gordon and Ruffini [2018]. Year 2012 represents school
year 2011/2012, and year 2017 represents school year 2016/2017. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 1.8: High School DID Results
(Total Discipline) (Code of Conduct) (Substance) (Truancy) (Fighting) (Weapon) (Other)
UFB Participation -0.128** -0.135** -0.133*** -0.232 -0.066 0.011 -0.075*
(0.050) (0.061) (0.042) (0.233) (0.051) (0.042) (0.039)
Total Students 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Black Rate 0.025*** 0.028*** 0.006*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.000 0.012***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Asian Rate -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.020*** -0.003 -0.012*** -0.003 -0.011***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.015) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Hispanic Rate 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.007*** 0.026*** 0.013*** -0.000 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Free/Reduced Lunch Rate 0.004*** 0.002 0.004*** 0.004 0.002** 0.002*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Annual County Wage 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Annual County Employees -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sample Years 12-17 12-17 12-17 12-17 12-17 12-17 12-17
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,886 10,260 6,877 812 5,303 2,499 6,577
R-squared 0.716 0.697 0.763 0.689 0.705 0.274 0.602
Results are in the IHS (Inverse Hyperbolic Sine), and total students per school is controlled for. Each of the control variables is a rate. For all the schools
the demographics, including free lunch, rates are calculated and used in the regression. School level demographics such as total students and ethnicity are
controlled for. The results are just for High School discipline reports and Never-Participating schools are excluded from the analysis following the methods
of Gordon and Ruffini [2018]. Year 2012 represents school year 2011/2012, and year 2017 represents school year 2016/2017. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 1.9: 2SLS Fuzzy RD Results
(1) (2)
VARIABLES UFB Total Campus Conflict




Total Students 0.000*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
Black Rate 0.002*** 0.018***
(0.000) (0.001)
Asian Rate -0.001*** -0.009***
(0.000) (0.003)
Hispanic Rate 0.002*** 0.007
(0.000) (0.001)
At Risk Rate 0.000*** -0.013***
(0.000) (0.001)
Bilingual Rate 0.000*** -0.027
(0.000) (0.001)
Annual County Wage -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)




Robust S.E. YES YES
Sample Years 2012-2017 2012-2017
F-stat 1434.94
The cutoff point is 80% Free and Reduced rate, so the sample was restricted to
schools that were both 20 points above and below the cutoff. The first column
is the first stage regression results when UFB is the outcome variable and the
variable of interest on the right hand side is the schools free and reduced rate,
which is highly significant and the first stage F-stat is over 900 with an R-
squared of .3252 which all points that it is highly unlikely that the results are
driven by a weak instrument. Column 2 shows the second stage regression
results, and once UFB is instrumented in we see that there is a reduction in
total conflict of 13.1%, which is consistent with the graphs in figure 5 that
showed that after the cut off there was a general reduction in total school
conflict, and also with the results from the Fixed effects and DID models.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Figures
Figure 1.1: Percentage increase in served meals
The figure shows the percentage increase in the total number of breakfasts and lunches served at
UFB participating schools compared to schools that do not participate.The increase possibly
comes from not only the reduction in negative stigma associated with free meals (Marples and
Spillman [1995], Poppendieck [2010]), but also from students who would not be individually
eligible, but now have access to free meals.
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Figure 1.2: School Breakfast Count Graph
Source: Texas Education Agency In school year 2012/2013 there are 8,787 schools and at the end of the panel in
school year 2016/2017 there are 8,822 school. Growth in school throughout the panel was minimal.
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Figure 1.3: UFB Participation before and After SB 376
The Top left shows the average UFB participation by the schools Free and Reduced rate, which were school years
2011/2012 and 2012/2013. The top right graph shows the same but after SB 376 was passed requiring all schools
with a free and reduced rate of 80% or more to participate in UFB. Quadratic fit lines are used in all three plots and
the cutoff line is included in the Pre SB 376 plot just to show where it would be if the bill was already a law. Both
before and after the bill was passed you see the same general trend below the cutoff. Before the bill was passed UFB
participation peaked at about the 80% free and reduced mark then gradually staying the same then slightly increasing.
This is in sharp contrast to after the bill was passed there was 100% UFB participation after a schools free and
reduced rate was over 80%. The bottom plot shows the relationship with the outcome of interest, total school conflict.
As it shows, once the bill was passed, and UFB was required at schools who’s free and reduced rate was 80% or
more, those schools after the cutoff and up until the 95% free and reduced rate see lower discipline reports.
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Chapter 2
Fracking and Tracking: The Effects of Oil
and Natural Gas Well locations on the
housing market.
An individual’s home is often their greatest source of wealth. Home ownership is also a part
of the great “American Dream”, where throughout generations ones home is viewed as a symbol
of pride. Given these facts, it is not surprising that home owners care so deeply about maintaining
their homes value.
Over the past 25 years the US has seen a huge increase in the construction and development
of oil/gas well injection sites. According to the US Energy Information Administration, hydrauli-
cally fractured and horizontally drilled wells are now the majority of all new wells drilled, and
by 2016, about 670,000 of the 977,000 producing wells were hydraulically fractured and horizon-
tally drilled. Hydraulic fracturing has led to a mining boom across the US. Fracking technology
in combination with horizontal drilling has made shale deposits that were previously not econom-
ically exploitable now profitable. Consequently, employment in the mining sector has reached
levels not seen since the early 1990s (Fetzer et al. [2014]). This boom in the oil and gas industry
helped make the United States the top oil producing country in the world, accounting for 18% of
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world oil production (U.S. Energy Information Administration). Energy prices and their connec-
tion to other economic variables, such as employment, wages, output, and urban development, has
been an area of interest for academic economist since the oil price shocks in the 1970s (Berndt and
Wood [1975]). Previous literature has shown that local communities around shale deposits can see
an increase in employment in the mining community, as well as have significant spill-over effects
into different sectors at the locations where resource extraction is taking place (Fetzer et al. [2014],
Weber [2012, 2014], Weber et al. [2014]). Aside from creating thousands of jobs, fracking has also
helped secure US energy security and can make the US economy less carbon intensive, as we have
relied less on coal and more on natural gas production (U.S. Energy Information Administration).
However, this progress is not without new challenges and risks. Over the past decade, hydraulic
fracturing has also been negatively highlighted in news reports and politics.17 Hydraulic fracturing
causes earthquakes, specifically in Oklahoma and Texas (Frohlich [2012]); wells that have leaking
cases can contaminate air and groundwater (Darrah et al. [2014], Muehlenbachs et al. [2015]), and
some have asserted the general presence of a well may be a disaminities for some individuals. In
2013, The Wall Street Journal analyzed well location and census data for more than 700 counties
in 11 major energy-producing states and found that nearly 15.3 million Americans lived within one
mile of a well that has been drilled since 2000 (Gold and McGinty).
One way to simultaneously measure the positive and negative impacts of the recent boom, is
through the housing market, focusing on how individual home owners are affected through changes
in their homes value. This paper focuses on this question. Using data from 11 different energy
producing states, we focus on the variation in home sale prices and spatial differences in new well
locations to analyze the impacts of hydraulic fracturing on homeowners.
So far, the literature on hydraulic fracturing and home prices has been focused on small popula-
tions, rural areas, small sample sizes, or how ground water treatment affects homes next to disposal
sites (Boslett et al. [2016], Gopalakrishan and Klaiber [2014], Muehlenbachs et al. [2015]). The
results are mixed with some of the research pointing to a decrease in home values when they are
close to wells or when the home uses private ground water. On the other hand, homes that are on
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piped water see a slight increase. Balthrop and Hawley [2017] look at a specific county, Tarrant
County, TX, and the Barnett Shale region, to see how homes are affected when they are within one
half of a mile of a well. On the other hand, Weber et al. [2014] looked at the same shale region and
found a net positive affect on home prices over the span of a decade. Our paper seeks to add clarity
to the literature by using a large data set of wells and home across 11 different states and over a
span of 18 years to analyze the longer run impacts new wells have on home prices. We also add to
the literature by focusing on all sales, repeat sales, and utilizing a spatial difference-in-differences
model that exploits quasi-experimental variation from homes that maintain their distance from the
nearest well site throughout the sample period, compared with a treatment group that initially dis-
plays the same distance to wells as the control group, but then has this distance reduced through
the construction of a closer well site.
The remaining portions of the paper proceed as follows. Section 2 describes briefly the back-
ground of hydraulic fracturing and some of the past literature. Section 3 describes the data. Section
4 describes the methodology. Section 5 present the results. Robustness checks and various exten-
sions are presented in Section 6 and 7. Finally, sections concludes.
2.1 Background Literature
There have been two advances in well drilling technology that have made it economically
meaningful to drill in shale deposit regions, hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling. Many
areas across the country have shale oil that are of low pressure permeability, which means conven-
tional drilling technology extraction would not be profitable. Hydraulic fracturing and horizontal
drilling have alleviated these constraints. This new combination, from an economic and financial
perspective, makes Fracking extremely cost effective. Oil and gas companies can drill one well
production pad that acts as multiple wells, making the above ground footprint less invasive. Fi-
nally, if the well is connected directly to a pipeline, there is no need for above ground storage tanks
to hold the oil/gas.
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The process of fracking involves getting roughly a 0.5 acre of land to establish a pad foundation.
Next, a company would come in with a drilling derrick about 150 ft tall, to bore the well. From the
vertical well, multiple horizontal wells are drilled in any direction into the desired target area(s)
below. Horizontal wells come in three varieties depending on the horizontal distance it takes the
well to go from ground zero to the depth of the targeted area. Long radius wells, which require
more than a thousand feet to reach 0 degree level (targeted area), and short and medium radius
horizontal wells, that have sharper turns. According to Halliburton, once you start fracking it
takes about 3-10 days. The process starts with a hole that is drilled 1,000 to 4,000 feet deep.
Next, steel casings are placed into the well and the space between the casing and the hole are
filled with cement. This process is needed to ensure groundwater is protected and to prevent gas
leaks. This process is replicated numerous times, each time size of the casings gets smaller and
smaller. Eventually, they eventually reach a total depth of 6,000 to 10,000 feet, where the gas
can be accessed.18 After the depth and casings are reached and complete, a perforated pipe gun
is inserted into the horizontal part of the hole that produces explosions that create fractures in the
shale. Fracking fluids, (3 to 5 million gallons of water) are mixed with chemicals and sand, and is
then pumped at high pressure into fractures.
After fracking is complete and the drilling equipment is removed, the only visible structure
above ground are 5-6 feet of surface valving left behind. Additionally, the average well can go two
years before it needs to be extensively serviced, and can be re-fracked many times over. These new
approaches to fracking have reduced the cost of drilling new wells, as well as, making it easier
to place well sites in denser urban areas. Well location is also not random. Specifically, they
are going to be placed in areas where there is oil or natural gas to be extracted and near major
roads/highways for ease of access. As mentioned before, with horizontal drilling they can locate
the well head closer to highways/roads, and still drill horizontally in multiple directions to access
the target areas. In residential areas, this means companies will be vying for the same land as home
builders. In our data we analyzed this relationship between home sales and new wells, finding that
there is such a relationship. Specifically, homes and wells both target similar intersections and
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access to highways and roads. To mitigate the expected bias associated with this non-random
placement we use a spacial difference-in-differences.19
Our paper fits into the broader recent research that has looked at the housing market and the
amenities or dis-amenities that oil and gas wells have on home value. Currently there is no clear
consensus on the short or long term affects, This is because some studies focus on more rural ar-
eas in the Marcellus Shale of Pennsylvania and New York (Boslett et al. [2016], Delgado et al.
[2016], Gopalakrishan and Klaiber [2014], Muehlenbachs et al. [2015]), or specifically on the Bar-
nett shale of Texas by the greater Dallas metro area (Balthrop and Hawley [2017], Weber [2014]).
Our paper instead focuses on the broader cross-state effects of oil and gas well locations and the
effects it has on the housing industry.
Hydraulic fracturing has the potential to provide many benefits, as well as costs, to local
economies. Homeowners that have mineral rights can get royalty payments from the drilling and
extraction of oil and gas.20 Broader benefits come in the form of a boost to the local economy that
hydraulic fracturing has been shown to bring. These impacts include increases in employment both
within and outside of the mining sector. Fetzer et al. [2014] found that each oil and gas sector job
creates about 2.17 other jobs. Maniloff and Mastromonaco [2015] found that counties with shale
development had 6% higher wages.In other studies, findings suggest wages in the oil and gas sector
increased by approximately 30%, wages in retail increased by 6%, and in the hotel sector wages
increased by 17% (Marchand [2012], Mason et al. [2015], Weber [2012, 2014]). These wage in-
creases were not limited to short term gains. Feyrer et al. [2017] find that roughly two-thirds of
the wage income increase persists for two years. Ooms and Tracewski [2011] analyzed the rural
Marcellus Shale region and found that counties that had an increase in wells also saw an increase
in housing demand. Lastly, Raimi et al. [2020] used voting data from precinct-level results of a
2018 election in Colorado to analyze Proposition 112, a measure that would have made about 80
percent of Colorado’s surface area off limits for drillers. The proposition failed. They found parti-
san affiliation correlates very strongly with support for oil and gas development, and that voters in
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precincts with higher levels of oil and gas activity are more supportive of the industry and drilling.
Hydraulic fracturing has the potential to negatively impact homeowners as well. When wells
are being drilled and fractured there can be an increase in noise and air pollution, traffic, potentially
spills and other environmental hazards (Lipscomb et al. [2012]). The greatest danger can come
from a well leaking and potentially contaminating ground water.This phenomenon has been shown
to have a negative impact on home values (Zabel and Guignet [2012]). Outside of fear of spills,
the oil and gas industry equipment might bring other dis-amenities which may affect a homes
sale price. The newer well heads being drilled leave a smaller above ground footprint, but during
the drilling process itself has a large above ground footprint and may be unsightly (Lipscomb
et al. [2012]). Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber (2014) show increased truck traffic and noise during
construction and fracturing may be an annoyance for homeowners. Fear of pipeline explosions
may drive some households to not want to live near well heads, but Boxall et al. [2005] found no
evidence that pipelines negatively affect sales prices.
Previous studies on the effect of hydraulic fracturing on home values have been largely con-
centrated in two areas; the Marcellus Shale of Pennsylvania and New York and the Barnett shale
of Texas by the greater Dallas metro area. In two papers by Muehlenbachs et al. [2012, 2015] they
use a triple difference-in-difference approach to estimate the effect of fracking on home prices.
The authors find negative effects of hydraulic fracturing are mostly felt by rural homes dependent
on groundwater, while the effect for homes with piped water is slightly positive. In another study,
focused on Washington County, PA, Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber (2014) find that negative effects
of fracking are felt by homes on groundwater during the well construction phase, but the effects
vastly decrease once well construction has finished and also as the distance from the well increases.
Conversely, Delgado et al. [2015] focused on two counties in northeastern Pennsylvania, failing to
find strong evidence that fracking significantly reduces home values. Following that, Boslett et al.
[2016] utilize a drilling suspension in New York and find the likelihood of shale oil and gas drilling
increases the value of properties.
A second wave of papers focus on the Barnett shale of Texas. Weber et al. [2014], analyzed this
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area and found that property values have appreciated in shale producing ZIP codes relative to non-
shale ZIP codes over the course of a decade. Specifically, they show the increase in home prices
is attributable to the effect shale gas development has had on public finances. The increase in rev-
enues has allowed for more public spending, while still maintaining lower property taxes. Mineral
rights are also important. If a homeowner has mineral rights, they are entitled to royalty payments
from the production of a well. Vissing [2015] looks at factors driving tract-level heterogeneity in
the caliber of leases executed by property owners who transfer their mineral rights to firms that drill
and extract natural gas. Timmins and Vissing [2015] use a dual-gradient hedonic model to measure
the capitalization of lease clauses into housing values. That they are able to analyze the effect of
spacial proximity to hydraulically fractured wells and lease quality on a houses appraisal values.
Lastly, Balthrop and Hawley [2017] looked at the Barnett shale of Texas and exploit variation in
distance to nearby gas wells in home sale prices to estimate the effect. They looked at an urban
area and found that wells within 3,500 feet reduces property values by 1.5%-3.0%. Our study
covers 11 different states containing both rural and urban areas. Similer to Balthrop and Hawley
[2017], we are able to estimate the net effect of wells on higher density settlements. Currently,
the net effects on higher density areas is still unclear. In these areas more homeowners are being
exposed to the full cost and the spillovers of being in close spatial location to hydraulic fracturing.
The case could also be that in higher density possibly makes homeowners less sensitive to nearby
drilling, like Raimi et al. [2020] found. Here the attest that because there are numerous alternative
roads that can be used during construction, homeowners that are are around wells do not see any
increase in wells as a negative. Lastly, this study is not confined to a single region but looks across
multiple states. This will also allow for a more aggregate analysis that the long run impacts of the
fracking boom has had on the housing market as a whole.
Finally, this study uses multiple empirical approaches including spatial variation with zip code
and household fixed effects to measure the treatment effect of nearby hydraulically fractured wells
on property values, a repeat sales estimator that looks at just repeat sales to examine how they
change before and after a well is located next to them, and lastly a spatial difference-in-differences
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to help account for the non-random location of wells. Our data shows that new wells and new
homes are both competing for desirable locations near the same roads, highways, interstates, and
access points. By using a spatial difference-in-differences, we are able to mitigate location bias,
and see how a homes price changes when it was once 2 miles away from a well, a new well comes
in decreasing the distance to the nearest well, compared to homes that are always 2 miles away.
Beyond that, the use of a repeat sales estimator with household level fixed effects allows us to better
control for property level fixed effects. Others have controlled for property level fixed effects, but
they were either in rural settings, or in a single county. Past papers that have controlled for spatial
variation, such as Timmins and Vissing [2015] and Delgado et al. [2015], employ identification
strategies that compare observations within the same time period and geographic boundary, that
are near and far from a well. Balthrop and Hawley [2017] did have a panel analysis that spanned
multiple years, but it does not cover as many years and was restricted to a single county in Texas.
Finally, our paper contributes to the existing research by having a spatial analysis and a repeat
sales model, both with ZIP and household fixed effects. This study also covers 18 years and
analyzes homes across 11 high oil and gas producing stats. This allows us to examine both the
larger cross-state macroeconomic effect. Additionally, we look individually at each state to see the
microeconomic effect that the fracking boom has had on the housing market.
2.2 Data
2.2.1 Housing Data
We gather data from two main sources. The first comes from Zillow, a popular tool used by
researchers and the public to search for properties available for sale in a given area. The company
provides a centralized source of property transactions through its Zillow Transaction and Assess-
ment Dataset (ZTRAX). 21 This dataset compiles multiple listing services (MLS) from all eleven
oil producing states being used in my sample, between years 2000-2018, containing just over 16.4
million observations. The information includes details of a given housing market transaction, such
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as the sales price and date, as well as, large number of home characteristics, such as the number of
rooms, bedrooms, bathrooms, square footage of the property, and any structures on it.
We consider all homes in each of the 11 states that are used in the sample, if and only if, the
Zillow housing data is representative of a states’ housing market. Unfortunately, MLS reporting
standards are not uniform across all states. For example, Utah has only a few counties which
consistently reports transactions to the states’ MLS, so we exclude those observations from the
main analysis22. Additionally, since we are focused on locations of wells and the affects on the
housing market, I only consider homes which Zillow documents as residential properties. Some
states do report business, government, and other non-residential properties, but these observations
are excluded.
The data is also filtered for situations where it is likely a non-market transaction. We only
included observations that are categorized as a deed transfer, which means the exchange of a prop-
erty’s title from one party to another. To ensure that results are not being driven by incorrect or im-
probable observations, transactions which had sales prices below $10,000 and above $10,000,000
are excluded, similar to Cheng et al. [2018]. On the lower end it is not likely that transactions who’s
prices fall below $10,000 occurred on the market. Such transactions may have slipped through the
DataClassStndCode filter. Transactions with prices above $10,000,000 are extraordinary, and in
some cases are possibly the result of data entry errors, as well as, not being representative of a
states housing market. House characteristics are filtered as well to exclude observations that are
in the top thousandth or top ten-thousandth percentile. This filtering, for example, eliminated any
observation with over 1,000 bedrooms. This filtering process also removed a large number of ob-
servations in states which do not require counties to report the home characteristics, such as Utah
and Wyoming. We provide a more comprehensive examination of our data cleaning process for
the Zillow data in the Appendix. Summary statistics are presented in Table 2.1.
We also our data into sub-samples to check for potential sources of bias. Table 2.2 shows
the total number of treatment homes for each state and the total number of treatment homes in
one of the three buffer zones per state. States such as Utah and Virginia have low treatment to
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control ratios, but are included in the initial analysis. A robustness check we drop states with a low
treatment to control ratio and re-estimate. Table 2.3 looks at the summary statistics for houses in
ZIP codes that have wells present, relative to houses in ZIP codes that do not. Ideally, the means
of these two samples should be similar. In fact, Table 2.4 shows they are very similar.
2.2.2 Oil and Natural Gas Well Data
The second data set contains the well information, it was acquired from the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security. It provides a mostly complete listing of most of the oil and natural gas
wells locations across the USA.23 The data set contains just over 1 million well locations, and has
detailed information such the wells operators, location by longitude and latitude, approval date,
status, and type of well. Companies are not required to give a public notice about their intent to
drill, but permit records are public information and individuals can access them. They are located
in a sate level database on the web site of the agency that is in charge of oil and natural gas
production.24 This means that unless individual specifically is looking for this information they
would not know if/when a well could be placed near their home. This suggests that home prices
should not be affected before a well is actually built, since their is little foreknowledge of the
drilling. Also, most of the wells can be turned on and off over night, and once it is in off mode, or
if they become an orphaned well, most of the physical structure is still there, where homeowners
can still see it. Table 2.4 shows how many wells were drilled between 2000 and 2018, and that
years average crude oil closing price. Between 2000 and 2008 the yearly wells drilled gradually
increases and spikes between 2006-2008. This is expected because during those years oil prices
were hitting record highs. Drilling slowed down after oil prices went from a yearly closing average
of $99.67 in 2008 to $61.95 in 2009. The biggest one year jump in wells drilled came in 2014
when 33,285 wells were drilled, which corresponds to a spike in oil prices when the yearly closing
average went back up to $93.17. The following years, well drilling slowed drastically partially due
to OPEC and Russia flooding the oil markets near the end of 2014 resulting in the average yearly
closing price of oil in 2015 dropping to $48.72. Table 2.4 also shows how fast the oil and gas
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sector can respond and quickly ramp up production, or just as easily slow it down.
2.2.3 ArcGIS
Using each house and well longitude and latitude, we are able to use ArcGIS to spatially plot
the wells on a map of the United State and create a various sized buffers around each well. For each
year, to identify what wells were established, we selected wells that were in use from that year and
all the years before. This allowed us to isolate the correct number of new wells and their location
for each year. Once layers were created for each year, we then imported the housing transactions.
Again, to isolate the homes that were sold each year to create a layer that just contained each years
housing transactions. Once each yearly layer was created we were able to match corresponding
well and housing years together to separate out the homes that fell inside each wells .5 mile buffer.
The same process was used to identify homes that fell between .5 miles and 1 mile , and again for
homes that fell between 1 mile and 2 miles of a well. Figure 1 shows a map of all wells used in the
sample.
2.3 Methodology
This project mainly aims to find the average effect of oil and natural gas well locations on the
housing market, and to test and see if consumers are driven away from homes close to wells, if
they are indifferent, or if the oil/gas sites increase local economic activity thus increasing housing
demand.
To test the hypothesis we use three approaches. First, we will start with a panel data fixed
effects model, then a repeat sales model, and finally a spatial Difference-in-Differences. First
consider the following fixed effects model:
log(Priceijt) = α1Treatit+α1Treat1it+α2Treat2it+α3Treat3it+γXijt+δj+ρt+εijt (2.1)
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Household level observations are used in the equation, and the primary dependent variable
log(Priceijt), is the logged house price of home i, in ZIP code j, at time t. Independent variable
of interest are Treatit, Treat1it, Treat2it, Treat3it where Treat = 1 if the home is located
within 2 miles of a well, Treat1 = 1 if the home is located 0-.5 miles of a well, Treat2 = 1 if
the home is located .5-1 mile of a well, and Treat3 = 1 if the home is located 1-2 miles of a well.
We use various ring boundaries in order to examine the sensitivity of the threshold definition for
the treatment group to the measured treatment effect. My boundaries also align with the thresholds
used by Balthrop and Hawley [2017] and Muehlenbachs et al. [2015] who used 3500, 5000, or
6500 ft (in miles, .5, .94, and 1.23) and 1 km, 1.5 km, and 2 km. (in miles, .62, .93, and 1.24).
Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber (2014) used boundaries between 0.75 mile and 2 miles, while Delgado
et al. [2016] used between 1 and 4 miles. I stop my boundaries at 2 miles for 2 reasons. First,
Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber found significant fading of the treatment effect by 2 miles; Delgado
et al. [2016] estimate that the treatment effect reduces to zero around 4 miles. Secondly, our
sample area covers much more dense housing markets where there are more properties and they
have access to a greater number or alternative routs to get around remote drilling.
In addition, Xijt is a vector containing traditional housing characteristic controls such as num-
ber of rooms, bedrooms, square feet, age of property, state GDP, state population, state land area,
as well as county poverty counts and county median household income to control for state and
county-level time-varying demographic factors. Finally δj is zip code level fixed effects and ρt is
a month-year fixed effect. Table 2.2 shows a breakdown of how many total treatment homes and
how many homes fell into each treatment buffer zone by state. We also cluster the standard errors
by zip code to allow for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within the same zip code
over time.
One possible concern with equation 1, when using a ZIP code level fixed effect, is the possible
existence of un-observable characteristics of the properties that might be correlated with observed
variables, including the three boundary zones. Hence, we estimate equation one again this time
using a household level fixed effects. After that I restrict my sample to only repeat sales. Using a
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household level fixed effect allows us to control for some of the possible bias with ZIP code fixed
effects. Additionally, there are two advantages of a repeat sales model. First we are able to run
the model with both ZIP code and household level fixed effects. Second, we are able to difference
out the unobservables effect assuming they are constant at both sale points. Balthrop and Hawley
[2017] also used a repeat sales model, but when they restrict their observations to only repeat sales
their sample is reduced by 64%. Since our panel is so long, our sample is only reduced by 26.6%,
still with just over 9.5 million transactions. We follow a repeat sales model similar to Balthrop and
Hawley [2017] with the estimating equation:
log(Priceijt+θ/Priceijt) = (α1Treatit+θ − α1Treatit) + γXijt + λi + ρt + εijt (2.2)
Each property included in the repeat sales model has at least two transactions: the original
transaction price at time t is given by Priceijt, and the second price at time t + θ is denoted
Priceijt+θ. Now, the percentage change in price can be explained by the change in proximity to a
well. In this model I use λi first with ZIP code level fixed effects then again with household level
fixed effects.25 WE also cluster the standard errors in this model as we did in equation 1.
As stated earlier, a source of possible Endogeneity in equations 1 and 2 is the non-random
location of a oil/gas well sites. Both home builders/buyers and oil and gas companies are looking
for places to build/buy/drill that have easy access to roads, interstates, and access points. Because
of this the selling price of a home might be affected by the location of well heads. To account
for this possible endogeneity concern, we use a spatial Difference-in-differences (SDiD) approach
such as the one used in Dronyk-Trosper [2017]. This study examined the local government’s
construction of public service facilities, such as fire departments and police stations, to see if
they impacted the local housing market. In that application, control homes were homes which
maintained their distance from the closest facility throughout the sample period. Treatment homes
are ones which at period t0 have the same distance as the control group but at some future period ts
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where s > 0, a new public service facility that reduces the distance to the nearest option. We follow
the same intuitive logic, but focusing on the placement of new wells that led to quasi-experimental
differences in proximity to wells. See Figure 2 for an illustration of these two groups. Homes listed
as the control are shown in the red 1 mile zone with no change in their distance to the construction
of a new oil/gas well. These are compared to the treatment homes that were in the original 1 mile
zone, but move closer to the .5 mile zone when the new oil/gas well is constructed. This method
provides additional clarity as to the probable pathway of housing capitalization effects. Significant
results here would help strengthen the idea that other significant findings are not likely from a
spurious effect relating to oil/gas well location choices. The SDiD model is represented by:
log(Pricei) = β1Treatmenti+β2BaseTreati+β3(Treatmenti∗BaseTreati)+γXi+εi (2.3)
with Treatmenti is an indicator variable which reflects whether a home is in one of the treat-
ment groups. BaseTreati is a dummy interaction term for whether a home sale occurred before or
after the construction of a new oil/gas well, and Xi is a vector of home characteristic controls. β3
is our variable of interest, which represents the change in home values for treated units following
the opening of a new well site. A significant value here would demonstrate that the construction
of a new well site altered local housing values. Again, the standard errors are clustered at the ZIP
code level. Lastly, to further round out the analysis we run equations one and three individually
for each state to analyze results at a more micro/state level.
In order to run the models at the per state level, each state needed to have not only enough ob-
servations, but also the treatment to control ratio could not be skewed to far to the control side. This
restriction did not allow some of the states, like Kansas, Kentucky, or Tennessee to be analyzed in
the main models. States that were able to be analyzed included California, Colorado, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. Looking more into individual states is also important because
state regulation may differ and affect measured amenities and/or dis-amenities from hydraulic frac-
turing. These estimated amenities and/or dis-amenities may not be the same from state to state.
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Each state may have different policies with respect to hydraulic fracturing operations, although
it is not clear which state has more overall stringent regulations. Pennsylvania, for example, has
longer setback restrictions on wells from buildings and water sources, whereas California has no
rule regulating set backs. Oklahoma has more restrictive venting and flaring regulations, whereas
Colorado requires more stringent pre-drilling water testing requirements (Richardson et al. [2013]).
Different states can also have different local zoning and noise regulation that may have an effect
on the amenities and/or dis-amenities homeowners are subject to. State and local finances are also
different across states where Oklahoma has a hybrid system that consists of a fixed amount and
a percentage amount, but Colorado is just a percentage of extracted gas. Given all of these dif-
ferences, we also conduct a state by state analysis to help give more insight into how regulatory
differences that affect the oil and gas industry translate into housing market impacts.
2.4 Results
Table 2.5 shows the estimated results for Equations 1 and 3. Columns 1 and 2 show the results
for the ZIP code level fixed effect model, when all states are included, and clustering at the ZIP
code. Columns 3 and 4 show the SDiD results. Because some states had extremely low treatment
to control ratios; we drop those states for the preliminary results, but don’t include them in the
refined sample and those results are presented in Table 2.6.26 When we include the states that have
a imbalance of treatment to control observations the fixed effects model has positive results but
they are not significant. But when we turn to columns 3 and 4, the SDID we gain significant and
positive results. When comparing homes that started off two miles from a well site, and then a
new well is drilled decreasing the distance to between one-half to one mile there is an increase in
selling price of 1.9%. Also, homes that are now within one-half mile from a well see an increase
of 6%. Column 4 shows homes that were once between one-half to one mile of a well, and then
become within one-half mile of a well, increased their selling price by 4.5%.
Table 2.6 shows the results when we take out states with low treatment counts and balance the
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overall sample. Now both the ZIP code level fixed effects model and the SDiD both show positive
and significant results. Columns 1 and 2, the ZIP code fixed effects models, show an increase in
the point estimates and gain significance. Column one now shows that homes within two miles of
a well get an increase in selling price of 1.6%, or evaluated at the mean transaction price roughly
a $5,393.73 increase. Homes that are within one-half mile of a well experience a 4.5% increase,
homes that are one-half mile to one mile from a well see a 2.5% increase, and homes that are one
to two miles from a well increase their selling price by .9%. The point estimates decreasing as the
distance from the well increase follows the assumption that both well sites and homes sites/owners
are competing for the same ease of access to roads, highways, and interstates, and is what past
research has also documented. The SDiD results using the restricted sample shows about the
same as the full sample result. The point estimates are slightly lower but none of the signifiance
is lost. Using the restricted sample, homes that started off two miles from a well and then a new
well is drilled decreasing the distance to be between one-half to one mile, show a .7% increase.
Similarly, homes that moved to be within one-half mile have a 2.9% increase. Finally, column
4 shows results for homes that were once one mile from a well, and transitioned to within one-
half mile of a well, receiving a 2.8% increase in selling price.27 These results align directly with
what Fetzer et al. [2014], Weber [2012], Weber et al. [2014] and Muehlenbachs et al. [2012] all
pointed to, and help support the hypothesis that the boom in hydraulic fracturing has increased
the local economy through increases in wages, employment, and local tax revenue. This in-turn
helps increase the demand for housing. Some would be concerned that hydraulic fracturing effects
of home values differs during the life-cycle of the well. But Balthrop and Hawley [2017] looked
at the impact of drilling on sales that occur within six months of well completion, and sales that
were made shortly after well drilling. They found that well construction does not seem to be the
primary driver of any amenity or dis-amenity on a homes selling price. The data also shows that
both new well sites and homes are attracted to the same plots of land where they have ease of
access to roads, highways, interstates which are both convenient for homeowners to be able to get
around quickly but also to well operators to have ease of access to the well heads. This also hints
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at the possibility that potential home buyers are not ”scared” away by oil/gas well sites and they
are indifferent because as fracking continues and grows it is more and more a part of our normal
reality.
2.5 Household Fixed effect and Repeat Sales Results
Table 2.7 shows the results for Equation 1 using household level fixed effects and Equation 2,
analyzing repeat sales with ZIP and household level fixed effects. Both of these approaches have
the advantage of being better able to control for constant and unobserved neighborhood quality
than the previous estimates. Additionally, they should produce the same, or nearly the same,
point estimates because when we analyze all transactions, but use a household level fixed effect it
should only look at homes that have been sold more than once. For these reasons are the preferred
specifications.
Columns 1 and 2 show the results of using household level fixed effects. Looking at the entire
sample, homes that are within two miles of a well still experience a positive and significant increase
in their selling price by 3.9%. Balancing the sample and taking out low treatment states the results
still hold, with the point estimate increasing to 4.9%, now with significance. Repeat sales estimates
are identified as a home that goes from being greater than two miles from a well to being within
two miles of a well. This is different than Equation 1 because it does not rely on spatial differences
in well exposure, which requires comparing houses that can likely be in different neighborhoods.
When our sample is restricted to just repeat sales and excluding the states that have a low treatment
count, we are left with a sample of 9, 594, 780 observations. The richness of our data allows for
a more in depth examination than previous repeat sales models have been able to do28. We use
two different levels of fixed effects, ZIP code level and Household level, along with clustering the
standard errors at the ZIP code level. Columns 3 and 4 show the results for both specifications.
The point estimates for both repeat sales models are largely the same as when we looked at the
entire sample. This was expected because as mentioned above making use of household level fixed
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effects in equation one will automatically look at only repeat sales in the full sample. On top of
that, restricting the sample to just repeat sales allowed for the use of two different layers of fixed
effects. The results presented in Table 2.7 are reassuring in that they confirm the results from our
outer estimations.
2.6 Individual States Analysis
The results presented in Table 2.5 are across 11 states and results in Table 2.6 and 2.7 are
across 7 states. However, state and local policies regarding hydraulic fracturing vary from state
to state. It is additionally not clear which states have the most stringent regulations. Some states
might be tougher on certain aspects, but simultaneously more relaxed on others. Because of this,
estimating Equations 1 and 2 for each state will provide a deeper view, to see if there are any
heterogeneous effects from state to state. Because some states have low treatment counts, this was
not possible for all states in the sample.29 Tables 2.8 through 2.12 show the results for California,
Colorado, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. Richardson et al. [2013] did a state by
state analysis that analyzed numerous different regulations per state and created a ranking for in-
dividual regulations but, not a clear overall state wide regulation ranking. Some of the regulations
included general well spacing, venting regulations, building setback requirements, flaring regula-
tions, pre-drilling water well testing, severance taxes, and accident reporting requirements. For
some of the regulations they are able to determine how stringently states regulate. This includes
setback restrictions, casing/cementing depth requirements, and command-and-control regulations
are quantitative reported. There analysis shows how widely the states vary in regulations that are
beyond federal regulations. The results from the state by state analysis shows positive, and
significant results except West Virginia, which showed negative and significant impacts. Starting
with California, and equation 1, the results show positive and significant point estimates for all
three buffer zones. the .5 mile zones has a 5.1% increase, the .5-1 mile zone has a 2.2% increase
and lastly the 1-2 mile zone has a 3.8%. When we look at the spatial model there is no significance.
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Where in Oklahoma and Colorado, which have a higher treatment to control ratio than California
there are positive and significant point estimates for both the Zip code fixed effect model and the
spatial difference in differences. Pennsylvania, a sate that much past literature has focused on,
shows positive point estimates only in the SDID model. It is hard to draw a clear reason why some
states show significant point estimates in just one or both of the models but I believe that is has
a lot to do with the states regulation and with its past history with hydraulic fracturing. Pennsyl-
vania encountered numerous ground water contamination reports in the early 2000’s, which might
contribute to a negative overall impression with fracking, but because in recent years they have not
had as many, homeowners that are around wells or homes that do not rely on ground water might
not see then as a dis-amenity anymore. This could explain why the SDiD shows significant point
estimates but not with the overall fixed effect model. According to the US Energy Information
Agency, Oklahoma accounted for 9% and 4.5% of the US natural gas and oil respectively. Col-
orado accounted for 5.6% and 4.2% of the US natural gas and oil respectively. These two states
had a balance of both oil and natural gas, where states like California and Pennsylvania did not. In
California they accounted for 3.3% of the total US oil, but only 0.8% towards natural gas. Penn-
sylvania was the countries second largest gas producing state accounting for 16%, but only 0.1%
towards oil. Instead Pennsylvania has a larger coal production.
The same also goes for West Virginia but they rely more heavily on coal, accounting for 12.6%
of total US production, and 5.5% and 0.4% towards gas and oil respectively. Looking at the to-
tal states regulations towards shale production West Virginia is the only state that regulates all 20
elements, where in Oklahoma they regulate 16. But on the other side states like Colorado and Ok-
lahoma have more quantitatively regulated elements than states like California and West Virginia.
In fact, West Virginia is the state with the most non-quantitatively regulated elements. Looking
at specific regulations the situation becomes more varied. West Virginia have cement type regula-
tions but Oklahoma and Colorado do not, and in California it is addressed in the drilling permit.
All of the states require at least a permit to withdraw water over the threshold of 1,000 gal/day, but
Pennsylvania and the Susquehanna RBC require permits for any water withdrawals for hydraulic
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fracturing and operate ecosystem models that provide the basis for rejecting applications for water
withdrawals that would put stress on ecosystems. Where West Virginia requires a similar water
management plan. For withdrawals of more than 210,000 gallons per month. To withdraw more
than 210,000 they need to document the source of the water withdrawal and shows its impact will
be minimal. Lastly, we see differences in states like Oklahoma and Colorado when it comes to
how fracturing fluids can be stored. In Oklahoma they require sealed tanks for some fluids, but in
Colorado pits are allowed and regulated for all fluids.
Because of these difference in how heavy the state relies on the oil and gas industry for em-
ployment and income and in regulatory standards, helps contributes to the reason we see mixed
results when we look at individual states and the affects hydraulic fracturing has on the housing
market. Out of the five, Colorado and Oklahoma seem to have the most in common. They both
share a similar balance when it comes to the extraction of oil and natural gas, as well as, many, but
not all state regulations. Both states show a positive and and significant point estimates for both
the Zip code fixed effect model and the spatial difference in differences. On average though, four
out of the five states examined showed positive and significant point estimates for either the Zip
code fixed effect model, the spatial difference in differences, or both. West Virginia had negative
and significant point estimates for both the Zip code fixed effect model and the spatial difference in
differences, but these estimates might be driven by the states heavy reliance on coil, which from an
industry perspective has been declining over the past decade and being replaced by cheaper natural
gas.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper uses data from over 15 million house transactions across 11 different states to show
that houses within two miles of a hydraulically fractured natural gas wells sell at higher prices
compared to homes that are not. The increase in price is largest in states that have a more balanced
treatment to control ratio, and for homes within one-half mile of a well pad. This is approximately
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4.5%, or when the sample house price is 337, 004.40 and increase of 15, 165.20. We controlled
for constant and unobserved neighborhood quality by controlling for both household level fixed
effects and repeat sales. Doing this, homes within two miles of a well see an increase in selling
price by 4.9%. These estimates extend previous studies because they not only show how the
broader housing market is affected, but the estimates depict the benefit to property net of any lease
payments, and reflect the overall costs and benefits to homeowners.
These findings, while potentially controversial, show that at least in the short run ignoring any
negative externalities related to global pollution, that any local disamenities are offset by the gains
in local economic opportunities. This does not mean potentially adverse long run impacts are not
important, but it dose help us understand the better socially relevant costs and benefits associated
with fracking. Local public finance will also be affected, through tax revenue generated from
both an increase in economic activity, directly through well permits, and indirectly through higher
property tax assessments
Lastly, this paper was able to look across five different states to be able to see how differences in
state regulation on the oil and gas industries impacted the housing market. Four of the five showed
positive results. But due to the complected nature and the wide variance in state regulations, it
is difficult to pin point exactly what regulations hinder the oil and gas sector the most, and what
impacts those have for the housing market. While we have done our best in trying to undercover




Table 2.1: State Housing Summary Statistics
count HP HP sqft rooms bedrooms bathrooms sqfeet yearbuilt wells
CA 8,503,009 434,726.30 251.03 2.97 3.12 2.21 1,747.96 1977.32 12,201
(445,818.60) (189.58) (3.544) (0.95) (0.84) (5,307.71) (24)
CO 1,771,029 290,086.40 171.45 3.70 2.96 2.41 1,882.01 1981. 47,374
(289,518.60) (398.42) (3.17) (0.98) (1.07) (1,113.15) (26)
KS 45,683 114,765.80 77.42 6.04 3.02 1.90 1,427.10 1960 86,790
(149,634.10) (100.15) (1.53) (0.85) (0.91) (628.88) (28)
KY 359,049 174,939.90 93.41 2.39 2.93 2.11 1,840.95 1980 12,297
(20,0437.80) (107.12) (3.14) (0.90) (0.85) (1,160.86) 31
OK 555,914 133,791.80 71.94 5.71 3.07 1.86 1,809.81 1979 25,605
(168,148.50) (95.29) (2.30) (0.69) (0.64) (824.50) 26
PA 2,183,286 196,639.60 105.46 6.36 3.13 1.79 1,804.77 1960 10,6073
(200,441.00) (88.88) (1.96) (.80) (0.85) (941.01) (36)
TN 874,251 170,397.20 74.99 6.33 3.08 2.10 2,256.33 1978 13,072
(194,195.00) (72.81) (2.05) (0.80) (0.89) (1,322.68) (26)
UT 39,461 168,552.10 118.36 8.75 3.69 2.02 1,421.36 1974 11,949
(145,809.10) (65.03) (2.78) (1.18) (0.87) (711.17) (27)
VA 1,967,558 295,113.90 151.22 5.02 3.33 2.55 2,024.50 1984 10,132
(233,333.70) (96.39) (3.33) (0.89) (0.97) (1,035.81) (23)
WV 127,345 142,562 77.53 6.28 3.02 1.94 1,829.23 1969 113,463
(166,406.80) (98.04) (1.62) (0.76) (0.84) (911.45) (33)
WY 3,529 171,798.60 117.86 4.98 3.09 1.99 1,478.70 1970 51,325
(262,969.70) (144.82) (3.10) (0.94) (0.80) (1,591.91) (29)
Total 16,430,114 337,004.40 190.11 4.05 3.12 2.20 1,833.14 1976 29,720
(374,030.30) (208.45) (3.47) (0.92) (0.92) (3,890.13) (27) (33,155)
Variable means are presented with standard deviations in parenthesis below. Observations are not aggregated so house price is ist level
where i is household, s is the state and t is the exact date of house contracts. Years 2000-2018 are included in the sample. Column 8 lists
the number of oil and gas wells that are located in the state according to the data provided by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
Table 2.2: State Treatment Summary Statistics
Treat Treat1 Treat2 Treat3 Non-Treat
CA 64,100 1,678 11,585 50,837 8,438,766
CO 80,430 14,144 240,10 42,276 1,690,358
KS 1,932 44 187 1,701 45,651
KY 676 49 138 489 356,959
OK 12,057 1,218 2,194 8,645 541,462
PA 60,674 5,474 19,067 36,133 2,122,528
TN 367 0 21 346 870,738
UT 11 0 0 11 39,802
VA 921 84 244 593 1,966,052
WV 15,226 1,635 3,500 10,091 111,244
WY 262 251 1 10 3974
Total 236,656 24,577 60,947 151,132 16,187,534
Treat 1 are any home in the sample that is within 1/2 of a mile of a
well. Treat 2 and 3 are the same but Treat 2 are any homes that are
between .5 to 1 mile of a well Treat 3 are homes that are 1-2 miles
from a well. Non-Treat are home that are farther than 2 miles from a
well.
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Table 2.3: State Base Treatment Summary Statistics
hp hp sqft rooms bedrooms bathrooms sqfeet yearbuilt
Homes in Control ZIP’s
mean 339,859.60 189.95 4.65 3.14 2.19 1,856.55 1977
(sd) (360,985.20) (167.61) (3.43) (0.93) (0.90) (5,168.10) (28.45)
Homes in Treatment ZIP’s
mean 333,727.20 190.39 3.31 3.09 2.21 1,804.63 1975
(sd) (389,580.90) (249.65) (3.37) (0.90) (0.93) (957.32) (26.32)
Total Sample
mean 337,108.40 190.15 4.05 3.12 2.20 1,833.25 1976
(sd) (374,097) (208.45) (3.47) (0.92) (0.92) (3,890.81) (27.53)
Observations 16,424,190
Table 2.3 looks at the summary statistics between houses in ZIP codes that have wells present in them to houses in ZIP codes that do
not. Ideally, the means of these two samples should be similar, and as Table 2.4 shows they in-fact are very similar. If the treatment
and control samples would have been different in the observed variables, then the samples might also vary in correlated unobserved
variables, which would bias the estimates. The table shows that both have means that are close.
Table 2.4: Well and Crude Oil Price Analysis




















These are the number of new wells drilled per year during the sample period. The huge drop off after 2014
was when the oil and gas market bottomed out with a decrease in demand and OPEC deciding not to cut
production.
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Table 2.5: Ln HP Results
VARIABLES LnHP LnHP LnHP LnHP
Within 2 Miles 0.006
(0.009)
.5 Mile Zone 0.029 0.060*** 0.045***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.014)
.5-1 Miles Zone 0.012 0.019*
(0.010) (0.010)
1-2 Mile Zone 0.000
(0.009)
Rooms 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.015*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
Bedrooms 0.131*** 0.131*** 0.177*** 0.154***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.022) (0.030)
Ln SqFeet 0.716*** 0.716*** 0.622*** 0.554***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.036) (0.052)
Year Built 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln State GDP 1.883*** 1.883*** 1.851*** 1.766***
(0.079) (0.079) (0.156) (0.214)
Ln State Population 0.360*** 0.356*** -0.240 -0.097
(0.115) (0.115) (0.271) (0.280)
Ln State Area -8.522*** -8.512***
(0.366) (0.367)
Ln County Poverty Count 0.017*** 0.017*** -0.001 -0.012**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006)
County Median House Income 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sample Full Full Base Treat 3 Base Treat 2
Observations 15,875,600 15,875,600 986,540 478,250
R-squared 0.734 0.734 0.704 0.663
Zip FE YES YES YES YES
Year-Month FE YES YES YES YES
Clustered S.E. YES YES YES YES
Results are in the Logged value of the sales price and the standard errors are clustered at the ZIP code
level. Columns 3 and 4 are the spatial DID results. Column 3 the sample is restricted to just Base Treat 3
homes and it looks at the affect when a home is initially in the 2 mile zone and then moves to the .5-1 or
0-.5 mile zones because a new well was drilled and the distance to the nearest well decreased. Column 4
is the same but looking at home that were once in the .5-1 mile zone and now are in the 0-.5 mile zone.
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Table 2.6: Ln HP Results dropping low Treatment States
VARIABLES LnHP LnHP LnHP LnHP
Within 2 Miles 0.016*
(0.009)
.5 Mile Zone 0.045** 0.029* 0.028**
(0.018) (0.015) (0.014)
.5-1 Mile Zone 0.025** 0.007
(0.011) (0.009)
1-2 Mile Zone 0.009
(0.009)
Rooms 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.016*** 0.017***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Bedrooms 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.097*** 0.091***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.013)
Ln SqFeet 0.725*** 0.725*** 0.669*** 0.662***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.016) (0.017)
Year Built 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln State GDP 2.387*** 2.388*** 2.156*** 2.050***
(0.074) (0.074) (0.130) (0.147)
Ln State Population -0.481*** -0.487*** -0.295** -0.218*
(0.112) (0.112) (0.115) (0.118)
Ln State Area -8.013*** -8.000*** -7.492*** -7.303***
(0.437) (0.437) (0.416) (0.434)
Ln County Poverty Count 0.024*** 0.024*** -0.006** -0.007***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
County Median House Income 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sample Restricted Restricted Base Treat 3 Base Treat 2
Observations 13,082,632 13,082,632 5,000,861 4,712,508
R-squared 0.743 0.743 0.663 0.651
Zip FE YES YES YES YES
Year-Month FE YES YES YES YES
Clustered S.E. YES YES YES YES
Results are in the Logged value of the sales price and the standard errors are clustered at the ZIP code
level. Homes with low treatment counts have been restricted from the sample. These include KY, TN,
UT, VA, and WY. Column 1 and 2 are the fixed effects model results. Columns 3 and 4 are the spatial
DID results. Column 3 the sample is restricted to just Base Treat 3 homes and it looks at the affect when
a home is initially in the 2 mile zone and then moves to the .5-1 or 0-.5 mile zones because a new well
was drilled and the distance to the nearest well decreased. Column 4 is the same but looking at home that
were once in the .5-1 mile zone and now are in the 0-.5 mile zone.
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Table 2.7: Household ID and Repeat Sales Model Results
VARIABLES LnHP LnHP LnHP LnHP
Within 2 Miles 0.039* 0.049** 0.016* 0.049**
(0.020) (0.022) (0.010) (0.022)
Rooms 0.006 0.006 0.008*** 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005)
Bedrooms 0.131 0.135 0.142*** 0.135
(0.142) (0.145) (0.007) (0.145)
Ln SqFeet 0.084 0.082 0.718*** 0.082
(0.151) (0.155) (0.010) (0.155)
Year Built 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003)
Ln State GDP 3.213*** 3.278*** 2.486*** 3.278***
(0.069) (0.084) (0.089) (0.084)
Ln State Population -2.852*** -2.866*** -0.513*** -2.866***
(0.160) (0.201) (0.128) (0.201)
Ln County Poverty Count -0.163*** -0.196*** 0.032*** -0.196***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.003) (0.009)
Ln County Median House Income 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sample Full Restricted Repeat Sales Repeat Sales
Observations 15,875,600 13,082,632 9,594,780 9,594,780
R-squared 0.893 0.894 0.725 0.845
Household FE YES YES - YES
Zip Code FE - - YES -
Clustered S.E. YES YES YES YES
Results are in the Logged value of the sales price and the standard errors are clustered at the ZIP code level.
These results are when we use the household level fixed effects to capture how repeat sales of homes are
affected when a well comes within 2 miles or closer. Column 1 is the full sample, where in column 2 I drop
low treatment to control states. These states include KY, TN, UT, VA, and WY. The results here help support
the hypothesis that housing demand is stimulated positively when hydraulically fractures wells are present and
the boost to the local economy helps boost the demand for housing.
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Table 2.8: California Results
VARIABLES LnHP LnHP LnHP
Within 2 Miles 0.035***
(0.002)
.5 Mile Zone 0.051*** 0.013 0.010
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
.5-1 Mile Zone 0.022*** -0.017***
(0.004) (0.004)
1-2 Mile Zone 0.038***
(0.002)
Rooms 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.022***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003)
Bedrooms 0.156*** 0.218*** 0.246***
(0.002) (0.006) (0.008)
Bathrooms 0.005*** 0.010*** 0.006***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Ln Sqfeet 0.784*** 0.855*** 0.865***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.007)
Year Built -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln County Poverty Count -0.002 0.002 0.029
(0.002) (0.008) (0.019)
County Median House Income 0.000* 0.000** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 8,502,866 421,095 132,742
Sample CA CA Base Treat 3 CA Base Treat 2
R-squared 0.750 0.765 0.758
Zip FE YES YES YES
Year-Month FE YES YES YES
Robust S.E. YES YES YES
Results are in the Logged value of the sales price. Column 1 is the fixed effects model results.
Columns 2 and 3 are the spatial DID results. Column 2 the sample is restricted to just Base Treat
3 homes and it looks at the affect when a home is initially in the 2 mile zone and then moves to
the .5-1 or 0-.5 mile zones because a new well was drilled and the distance to the nearest well
decreased. Column 3 is the same but looking at home that were once in the .5-1 mile zone and
now are in the 0-.5 mile zone.
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Table 2.9: Colorado Results
VARIABLES LnHP LnHP LnHP
Within 2 Miles 0.013***
(0.002)
.5 Mile Zone 0.066*** 0.035*** 0.011**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
.5-1 Mile Zone 0.040*** 0.026***
(0.003) (0.004)
1-2 Miles Zone 0.018***
(0.003)
Rooms 0.016*** -0.030*** -0.024***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.003)
Bedrooms 0.091*** 0.118*** 0.092***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.006)
Bathrooms 0.092*** 0.072*** 0.061***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.007)
Ln Sqfeet 0.534*** 0.278*** 0.275***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Year Built 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln County Poverty Count -0.005** -0.011 -0.008
(0.002) (0.009) (0.010)
County Median House Income 0.000* -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1,668,992 122,901 94,305
Sample CO CO Base Treat 3 CO Base Treat 2
R-squared 0.621 0.456 0.427
Zip FE YES YES YES
Year-Month FE YES YES YES
Robust S.E. YES YES YES
Results are in the Logged value of the sales price. Column 1 is the fixed effects model results.
Columns 2 and 3 are the spatial DID results. Column 2 the sample is restricted to just Base Treat
3 homes and it looks at the affect when a home is initially in the 2 mile zone and then moves to
the .5-1 or 0-.5 mile zones because a new well was drilled and the distance to the nearest well
decreased. Column 3 is the same but looking at home that were once in the .5-1 mile zone and
now are in the 0-.5 mile zone.
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Table 2.10: Oklahoma Results
VARIABLES LnHP LnHP LnHP
Within 2 Miles 0.031***
(0.006)
.5 Mile Zone 0.060*** 0.040** 0.024
(0.016) (0.017) (0.019)
.5-1 Mile Zone 0.070*** 0.057***
(0.012) (0.012)
1-2 Mile Zone 0.018**
(0.007)
Rooms 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.017***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Bedrooms 0.160*** 0.141*** 0.132***
(0.014) (0.021) (0.027)
Ln Sqfeet 0.826*** 0.719*** 0.698***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.012)
Year Built 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln County Poverty Count -0.005 0.021*** 0.025**
(0.004) (0.008) (0.012)
County Median House Income -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 553,519 133,522 52,323
Sample OK OK Base Treat 3 OK Base Treat 2
R-squared 0.401 0.482 0.508
Zip FE YES YES YES
Year-Month FE YES YES YES
Robust S.E. YES YES YES
Results are in the Logged value of the sales price. Column 1 is the fixed effects model results.
Columns 2 and 3 are the spatial DID results. Column 2 the sample is restricted to just Base Treat
3 homes and it looks at the affect when a home is initially in the 2 mile zone and then moves to
the .5-1 or 0-.5 mile zones because a new well was drilled and the distance to the nearest well
decreased. Column 3 is the same but looking at home that were once in the .5-1 mile zone and
now are in the 0-.5 mile zone.
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Table 2.11: Pennsylvania Results
VARIABLES LnHP LnHP LnHP
Within 2 Miles 0.015***
(0.003)
.5 Mile Zone 0.011 0.028*** 0.019**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
.5-1 Mile Zone 0.043*** 0.016***
(0.005) (0.005)
1-2 Mile Zone 0.003
(0.003)
Rooms -0.002* 0.101*** 0.114***
(0.001) (0.013) (0.018)
Bedrooms 0.071*** 0.148*** 0.095***
(0.003) (0.028) (0.030)
Bathrooms 0.100*** 0.268*** 0.240***
(0.002) (0.016) (0.019)
Ln Sqfeet 0.613*** 0.444*** 0.440***
(0.002) (0.007) (0.008)
Year Built 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.007***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln County Poverty Count -0.006* -0.011 -0.006
(0.004) (0.013) (0.016)
County Median House Income 0.000** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 2,183,202 171,198 109,586
Sample PA PA Base Treat 3 PA Base Treat 2
R-squared 0.645 0.453 0.427
Zip FE YES YES YES
Year-Month FE YES YES YES
Robust S.E. YES YES YES
Results are in the Logged value of the sales price. Column 1 is the fixed effects model results.
Columns 2 and 3 are the spatial DID results. Column 2 the sample is restricted to just Base
Treat 3 homes and it looks at the affect when a home is initially in the 2 mile zone and then
moves to the .5-1 or 0-.5 mile zones because a new well was drilled and the distance to the
nearest well decreased. Column 3 is the same but looking at home that were once in the .5-1
mile zone and now are in the 0-.5 mile zone.
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Table 2.12: West Virginia Results
VARIABLES LnHP LnHP LnHP
Within 2 Miles -0.016**
(0.007)
.5 Mile Zone -0.049*** -0.041** -0.028
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
.5-1 Mile Zone -0.033*** -0.026**
(0.012) (0.012)
1-2 Mile Zone -0.006
(0.007)
Rooms 0.012** 0.016*** 0.018***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Bedrooms 0.086*** 0.096*** 0.115***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.017)
Bathrooms 0.290*** 0.314*** 0.308***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.016)
Ln Sqfeet 0.558*** 0.560*** 0.565***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010)
Year Built 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln County Poverty Count -0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
County Median House Income 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 126,470 89,475 67,611
Sample WV WV Base Treat 3 WV Base Treat 2
R-squared 0.485 0.472 0.467
Zip FE YES YES YES
Year-Month FE YES YES YES
Robust S.E. YES YES YES
Results are in the Logged value of the sales price. Column 1 is the fixed effects model results.
Columns 2 and 3 are the spatial DID results. Column 2 the sample is restricted to just Base Treat
3 homes and it looks at the affect when a home is initially in the 2 mile zone and then moves to
the .5-1 or 0-.5 mile zones because a new well was drilled and the distance to the nearest well
decreased. Column 3 is the same but looking at home that were once in the .5-1 mile zone and
now are in the 0-.5 mile zone.
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Figure 2.1: US well map
The map was created using ArcGIS and shows the location of all the wells that were used in the
project.
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Figure 2.2: Spatial Difference in Difference Illustration
The red diamond marks a well that was constructed in 2014 and the red ring is the 1 mile buffer
zone that captures all homes. the green diamond is the location of a well that was built the
following year and has a .5 mile buffer zone. The intersection of the 2, the green shaded area, are
the new treatment homes, and the red shaded area are the control homes.
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Chapter 3
More Bang for your Buck: Flat Rate Tuition
and its effect on Educational Investment
and School Performance
Economists and other education policy makers have long been interested in understanding the
demand for higher education. Recently, barely more than half of college students are graduating
within six years (Shapiro et al. [2013]). Additionally, Bound et al. [2012] found the time-to-degree
has increased, particularly for students from low-income families. As tuition prices are rising,
student’s are taking longer to graduate which means the overall (or cumulative) cost of attending
college is increasing. Low income families will be the ones that are hit hardest, thus possibly
keeping them from attending.
Given these startling facts, many federal, state, and local policy institutions are looking at
ways to help reverse the above mentioned static’s to find ways to help make college more afford-
able. Examples include those focused on quantifying price elasticities for various student popula-
tions(Crouse [2015]) and estimating student sensitivity to changes in financial aid packages(Bryan
and Whipple [1995]).
Much of the early work on the demand for higher education was reviewed by Jackson and
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Weathersby [1975]. Using the parameters estimated in a number of studies, they concluded that
the net behavioral response to changes in tuition is modest suggesting: a decrease of between
0.05% and 1.46% in enrollment ratio per each $100 increase (in 1974 dollars) in student cost.
Additionally, they found a decrease in absolute magnitude of price responsiveness to decrease
with increasing income. In a meta-analysis of studies completed between 1967 and 1982, Leslie
and Brinkman [1987] concluded a $100 tuition price (in 1982 dollars) increase to be associated
with a 0.6 to 0.8 percentage point decline in college enrollments.
Heller [1997] provided an update to Leslie and Brinkman (1987). He concluded that a $100
increase results in a 0.5% to 1.0% decline in enrollments. But he pointed out that the empirical
work he examined used data from the 1970s and 1980s, so the effect might not generalize to the
higher tuition levels at the time of his analysis.
More recent research has analyzed net college price and students enrollment, persistence, and
college choices show that a 1, 000 change in college price (1990 dollars) is associated with a 3
to 5 percentage point difference in enrollment rates (Dynarski [2013]). Evidence on the effect of
college price on persistence and degree completion is not as well investigated, but most studies
suggest that persistence and completion are modestly responsive to prices for at least some groups
(Bettinger [2004]; Castleman et al. [2013]). Price also appears to be a strong predictor of the
specific college students choose to attend (Hemelt and Marcotte [2016]; Long [2004]), institution
level enrollment (Hemelt and Marcotte [2011]), and choice of major (Stange [2015]). While some
works have looked at price response in educational investment, there is little that has been done
that ew studies compare the impact of FRP versus PCH schemes on student educational and labor
market outcomes.
A number of studies look at outside interventions, such as grants or scholarships tied to perfor-
mance, that can alter a individual students choice in course load and performance. These include,
the Promise Scholarship in West Virginia which explicitly tied aid to the number of credits (and
GPA), and resulted in more students taking 15 credits rather than the full-time minimum of 12
(Scott-Clayton [2011]). A similar result was found for a scholarship program at the University of
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New Mexico (Miller [2011]). Yet, work on Georgias HOPE scholarship, which tied eligibility and
retention of funds to maintaining a 3.0 GPA, found that HOPE reduced the likelihood students took
full course loads and increased their propensity to withdraw from classes and to divert credits to the
summer (Cornwell et al. [2005]). Barrow et al. [2014] found that a performance-based scholarship
at community colleges in New Orleans increased credit loads, as did an intervention that combined
financial incentives and academic support services at a Canadian university (Angrist et al. [2009]).
At a large Italian university, Garibaldi et al. [2012] found that charging students extra for taking
too long to graduate speeds up time-to-degree.
Helmet and Strange (2016) is the only study (to my knowledge) that investigates flat rate tuition
compared to per credit hour tuition. They examine Michigan public high school graduates in the
classes of 2008 through 2011, and who attended one of the states public universities. They looked
at students who attended one of the state schools that charged per credit taken compared to those
on flat rate tuition. They found that exposure to zero marginal pricing tuition influences 7 percent
of students to attempt up to one additional course, or three credits hours. Along with that they
concluded that there was little evidence that these additional attempted credits resulted in more
earned credits in a semester. Secondly, they found that students facing flat rate tuition are more
likely to withdraw from at least one course and the likelihood of meeting the on-time benchmarks
for graduation was unchanged. A possible bias they pointed out with the study was the selection
bias of students picking what schools to go to, and that each schools pricing scheme would have
been know upfront by the incoming students. Our research extends Helmet and Strange (2016) by
looking not only at the academic impacts of FRT, but also how its effects the class registration and
credits attempted behavior of the student body. We evade the selection bias by looking at different
cohorts at the University of Oklahoma.We also look at behavioral changes of the mixed cohorts of
students who experienced FRT for 1, 2, or 3 years. With this data we can see how as the number
of years on FRT a student experiences impacts their course registration and academic performance
change.
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3.1 Background on Flat Rate Tuition
The University of Oklahoma switched from per credit hour tuition pricing to a flat rate tuition
(FRT) in the fall of 2013. According to the university, FRT was implemented to reduce the cost
of completing an OU degree. The rate is based on OU’s current 15 credit hour rate of tuition.
Students registered in fewer than 12 hours will continue to pay on a per credit hour basis. OU also
claimed that the FRT would allow students to graduate and enter the labor market sooner. They
claim that FRT would also save a student one or two years worth of room/board, transportation,
and other college-related expenses. The university may also be motivated the switch to FRT. In
particular, college rankings consider 4 year and 5 year graduation rates. Thus, if FRT could help
to improve the 4 and 5-year graduate rate it will also inprove the overall college ranking.
According to the university, part-time students, or students enrolled in 1-11 hours, are charged
a per credit hour basis. All undergraduate student registered in 12 or more hours will be charged
a flat rate based on the current 15 credit hour rate for tuition. College program and technology,
additional academic excellence, and course fees will continue to be charged on a per credit hour
basis. The FRT does not apply to Graduate, Law, Advanced Program student, or students enrolled
in only Liberal Studies courses. These students will be charged on a per credit hour basis for
tuition and fees. Summer courses are still continued to be charged on a per credit hour basis if a
undergraduate student registered for 15 hours in the fall and spring and did not “bank” any hours.
One of the surprising additions to FRT cohorts is they register for 12 and not 15 or more, they
can bank their 3 unused hours and if they want they can apply them for summer classes. In this
case a student that registers for 12 hours in the fall and spring could take tuition free 2 classes in the
summer. They would still have to pay the associated fees for the summer classes. The university
did set some restrictions with the banked hours. They cannot be converted into cash or held for a
future academic year. Also they do not go towards fees such as Academic Excellence Fees, College
Program and Technology Fees, Mandatory Semester Fees, and Course Specific Fees.
Some students might have situations that restrict them from enrolling in 15 credit hours per
semester. Because of this the university created an appeals process. Examples of students that
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might be eligible for an appeal are students with disabilities. Students’ that have fewer than 15
hours remaining per semester until graduation. Or students’ participating in a study abroad pro-
gram, have a temporary medical condition, or are participating in an internship.
3.2 Data
The data set comes from the University of Oklahoma, and a key characteristic is it consists of
student level data across 10 school years. The student level data is de-identified and each student
is given a unique number that we use to match them across all for reporting files. Our data ranges
from fall 2008 thorough May 2018. Flat Rate tuition was implemented in the fall of 2013. This
gives us five different types of student groups we can compare and analyze. First, one that were
never on FRT. The next group is our Mixed group, student that were on FRT for 1, 2, or 3 years
and pay by the hour on the remaining. Then our Always FRT students, ones that enrolled fall
of 2013 or later. The main data panel is at the semester level, but stationary in time. It shows
the end of semester each students semester GAP, freshman start semester, hours they completed
that semester, major, full/part time, residency information, demographics, financial aid/Pell grant,
citizenship, and graduation date. What this data set does not show us is the number of hours they
registered for the following semester and then kept/dropped after the ORD date (the date they
can drop any class and get a full refund for all fees and hours). To get this data, the university is
providing us with three transaction style data sets that shows as the semester went on, if the student
made any changes.
This first transactional data panel contains the number of hours a student registered for each
semester, and then the number of hours they had after the ORD date. An interesting question we
are going to be able to answer is if with the new flat rate tuition if the students are “hording” class
during registration periods. We want to see is if under FRT students are optimize by registering for
one more class than they want to actually complete, and “test driving” all the classes during the
first two weeks of the following semester. This optimizing behavior would allow the students to
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pick the classes they believe they will do the best in that specific semester. Table 3.1 shows cohort
mean graduation GPA. The always FRT cohort has a mean graduation GDP of 3.23% compared
to 3.19% for the pay per credit hour cohort. This would be beneficial for older classmates as
OU allows seniors to register first, followed by junior, sophomores, and finally freshman. On the
inverse of this positive effect, younger classmates are crowded out. As older classmates register
for more classes than they want then there is one less seat for a younger classmate.
The second transactional data panel covers tuition costs. This data panel will be a complete
breakdown of all applied fees, tuition costs, and how it changed as the semester went on and if
the student added or dropped a class how their final charged amount changes. Lastly, the third
transactional data set will cover all financial aid data. This includes if they had any federal sub-
sidized or unsubsidized loans, scholarship’s, grants (such as the PELL grant), and awards. This
will allow us to get a clearer picture of how the financial burden has changed since the new tuition
policy was started. In Table 3.1 we present the summary statistics for each group. Table 3.2 we
present just the freshman mean actual hours attempted with other key statics. A key finding is that
at the mean, all three groups register for just about the same number of classes. In fact all of the
statics are almost identical. Table 3.3 shows us the “Hording” by each of the groups, breaking out
the mixed group to how many years they were on FRT. Each group horded on average one class,
but the percentage of students that horded in the Always FRT group is 7.54% compared to only
3.64% in the per credit hour. This shows as the number of years on FRT goes down, the percent of
students that horde classes decreases. We believe here that when the marginal cost after 15 credit
hours was zero, more of the student population are willing to sign up for more class and then in
the following semester drop one after they were able to “test” out the classes and see which ones
they believed they could do the best in that semester.
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Table 3.1: Freshman Cohort Summary Statistics
Cohort Always Flat Rate Mixed Tuition Per Credit Hour
Cohort Freshman Observations 25,298 11,987 7,610
Cohort Mean Graduation GPA 3.23 3.16 3.19
(Percentage) (Percentage) (Percentage))
In State Students 58.70 61.12 64.39
Out of State Students 38.72 35.79 33.71
International Students 2.57 3.08 1.91
Not First Generation 76.01 83.82 99.92
First Generation Student 23.99 16.18 0.08
Citizen 96.62 96.74 98.24
Not a Citizen 3.38 3.26 1.76
Male 47.40 47.22 47.11
Female 52.60 52.78 52.89
Full Time 90.30 98.91 98.90
Part Time 9.70 1.09 1.10
White 78.29 75.15 72.56
African American 6.61 6.24 5.85
Asian 9.51 7.07 6.28
American Indian 10.35 9.11 7.36
Hispanic 9.91 9.29 3.61
Pacific Islander 0.49 0.68 0.34
Pell Grant 21.29 24.70 N/A
Sub Stafford Loan 27.80 29.74 N/A
Other than Cohort Observations, all of the statistics are percentages. Column 1 is the cohort of
students that were always under flat rate tuition. Column 2 are students that were under a mix of flat
rate and pay per credit hour. Column 3 is the cohort of students that were always under pay per credit
hour. For this cohort the University of Oklahoma did not provide data for First Generation status, Pell
Grant or Sub-Stafford Loan. Out of the entire sample there were 1,292 that did not wish to report their
race and 30 non citizens that did not report race.
Table 3.2: Freshman Credit Hours By Cohort
Mean Standard Deviation Median Minimum Maximum
Always Flat Rate 14.01 1.96 14 3 18
Mix Tuition 14.14 1.51 14 3 18
Per Credit Hour 14.26 1.35 14 3 18
Entire Sample 14.09 1.75 14 3 18
Observations 44,553
Row 1 shows summary statistics for incoming freshman credit hours at enrollment for students that
were always under flat rate tuition. This consisted of students that enrolled on and after Fall 2013.
Row 2 shows summary statistics for incoming freshman credit hours at enrollment for students that
were under both pay per credit hour and flat rate tuition. This consisted of students that enrolled
during Fall 2010 through Fall 2012. Students that enrolled in Fall 2010 would have been under pay
per credit hour for 3 years and flat rate for 1 year. Those that enrolled in Fall 2011 would have been
under each payment scheme for 2 years and those that enrolled Fall 2012 would have been pay
per credit hour for 1 year and flat rate for 3 years. Row 3 shows summary statistics for incoming
freshman credit hours at enrollment for students that were always under pay per credit hour. This
consisted of students that enrolled Fall 2008 and Fall 2009.
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Table 3.3: Enrollment and Drop Day Credit Hours
Cohort Always Flat Rate 3 Years Flat Rate 2 Years Flat Rate 1 Year Flat Rate Per Credit Hour
Cohort Observations 127,429 29,562 29,562 26,446 46,696
Number of Students that Horded 9,609 1,712 1,512 1,273 1,701
Percentage Horded 7.54% 5.8% 5.11% 4.8% 3.64%
Mean Credit Hours Horded 2.93 2.94 2.87 2.97 2.71
Max Credit Hours Horded 16 12 12 11 12
Hording is when a student registers for more credit hours during registration and then during the first 2 weeks of the semester they drop the classes they
don’t want and still get a full refund. The table shows that students under flat rate or cohorts that experience more years under flat rate then pay per credit
tend to register for more classes and then drop them once the school year starts, thus potentially blocking other students during the registration window,
during the previous semester, from being able to register for some classes that are full during registration but then seats free up when the hording students
drop them.
3.3 Theoretical Framework
3.3.1 Basic Model and Prediction
Following Hemelt and Stange (2016), we use the same static single period basic model predic-
tor to help better understand and analyze how the tuition-pricing schedule effects post-secondary
investment. In this framework, a students utility depends positively on the students lifetime con-
sumption c as well as, on time spent not in school, n. This implies attendance will incur effort costs
which will increase with the level of intensity. Students’ choose time spent in school, z, in order
to maximize utility u(c, n), which is subject to a students’ budget constraint and standard time
constraint. In this model, the time constraint is total time spent in (z) and out (n) of school equals
total time available, n+ z = H . Accordingly, the students’ number of credits taken can be thought
of as one measure of z. The budget constraint states that consumption equals the sum of endowed
income (I) and lifetime earnings minus tuition: c = I + E(z) − T (z). In Hemelt and Stange’s
static (single-period) model, they simplify things by assuming that each addition of schooling in-
creases earning potential by some fixed amount w, thus E(z) = wz. This simplification allows
both Hemelt and Stange (2016) and our research to abstract from effects of non-linearities in the
returns to college education and focus on the students decision about the number of credits they
take in a single period. From this, tuition is a nonlinear function of credit load, changing discretely
as an individuals credit load exceeds a threshold, z∗:30
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3.4 Methodology
The objective of the paper is to compare cohorts that experienced per-credit hour pricing strategy
to those that experienced a mix of flat rate and per-credit, and to those that only experienced flat
rate tuition pricing. Our data starts in 2008 giving us 2 cohorts that go from freshman year to
graduation under the per credit hour payment system. Freshman cohorts that entered from 2010-
2012 will have one to three years under the pay per credit system, and one to three years under flat
rate tuition. All incoming freshman from fall 2013 till the end of the data set will only experience
FRT. Because of these differences in cohorts we will be able to compare aggregate and individual
level choices. This type of set up will allow us to estimate a liner probability model with ordinary
lease squares (OLS) with the following form:
Yict = α + β1FlatRateict + γict + δc + εict (3.1)
Where Yict is the outcome variable of choice, registered credits per semester, for student i in cohort
c at time t. Our three primary outcome variables are indicators if a student registers for a credit load
greater and within certain thresholds. These include if a student attempted over 15 credit hours,
attempted between 12-15, and if a student attempted between 16-18. This follows and extends
the analysis from Hemelt and Stange [2016]. β1 is the coefficient for flat rate tuition, which is a
dummy for if student i in cohort c at time t is under flat rate tuition, γict is a vector of student level
measures, background characteristics and demographics, δc represents major fixed effects, and εict
is stochastic error term.
The primary coefficient of interest is β1, the effect of flat pricing on our outcome of interests.
We only include full time students because they are the only ones that would be effected by FRT.
To account for correlation in the errors among students at the same college or major, the standard
errors will be clustered. Usually, cluster-robust standard errors perform poorly in settings with
few clusters, but our data set contains a large enough sample size with a wide range of majors, so
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clustering should be achievable.
Some of the student differences might effect the outcome variables differently. One such dif-
ference might be the student age and if they are a traditional student or a non-traditional student.
Older or non-traditional students might be more/less willing to take more hours to save money or
because they have outside families, full time jobs, or be the sole source of income for the family.
To distinguish these students a cohort average age variable will be created using the ages of all the
students per cohort. Then we will set a restriction that for any age that is two standard deviations
above the average cohort age these will be classified as non-traditional students. This will be incor-
porated into the estimation equation to see the effects flat rate tuition systems have with a students
age. Gender, race, major, and family income qualities will be analyzed to see how the change to
a flat rate tuition system affects each one. Here we are thinking that for students that come from
a higher income quantile the decision to take a simple 12 hour or benefit with flat rate tuition and
take 15 or more would not matter as much as a student coming from a lower income quantile.
For accuracy the models will be run with just major fixed effects, to account for the differences
in course load between majors. The data also allows us to look at differences between specific
groups such as gender, race, and family income levels. This type of analysis will allow us to see
how different groups of individuals are affected and how they change their behavior in response to
the new pricing strategy.
3.4.1 Student GPA Analysis
The model we use for examining the effect FRT has on a students semester, yearly, and gradua-
tion GPA will be a advanced Fixed Effects model that account for semester fixed effects and major
fixed effects. In this analysis we are trying to see how students on full FRT, mix FRT and per
credit hour perform academically. The hypothesis is students on FRT are more likely to “horde”
classes and then self select the best ones to take before the free drop period is up, thus optimizing
their class selection based on how well they believe they can perform. If this is true they should in
theory be able to “test drive” the classes and then pick the ones they believe they individually will
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perform the best in. Generally, seniors are the first to be allowed to register, followed by junior,
then sophomores, and finally freshman. So the negative unintended consequence from FRT would
be that there are higher classmates that are “over” registering for classes and that is taking seats
away from the under classmates. That is why we believe a GPA analysis at the freshman level and
then the over all level is needed. We intend to do this with the following model:
log(Yict) = β1FlatRateict + γict + δc + σt + εict (3.2)
Where log(Yict) is the outcome variable of choice, GPA of student i in cohort c at time t. Our
primary outcome variables are semester, yearly, and graduation GPA. β1 is the coefficient for flat
rate tuition, which is a dummy for student i in cohort c at time t. We also look at students under
1, 2, 3, or always FRT compared to those that were not. γict is a vector of student level measures,
majors, background characteristics and demographics, δc represents freshman major fixed effects,
σt is a set of semester fixed effects, and εict is stochastic error term.
The primary coefficient of interest is β1, the effect of flat pricing on our outcomes of interests.
As with equation 1 we are only including full time students that would be effected by FRT. Also
like in equation 1, we account for correlation in the errors among students at the same college or
major and cluster the standard errors will be clustered at the major level.
Hemelt and Stange [2016] identified three possible sources of bias that might come about from
the basic model. One being they used samples of students from 2 universities with possible dif-
ferent student level demographics and characteristics. Our sample uses only students from the
University of Oklahoma, where pre selection into what school and pricing system is constant. Fur-
ther, we control for a wide array of student-level characteristics including Financial-aid received,
major, Stafford Loan, Pell Grant, Race, sex In State/Out of State, and International status.
Second, more financial aid might offset the increase tuition and fees associated with an increase
in credits, thus, diminishing the treatment. The counter to this is that the fact that the maximum
PELL amount increases discretely at students that are attending school quarter-time, half-time,
three-quarters-time, and full-time, but after a student is full time, taking 12 or more credit hours
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it does not increase in value. Like Hemelt and Stange [2016], we are also not aware of any insti-
tutional, state, or federal programs that explicitly allows or give increases in aid for students that
are taking more than 12 credit hours. In our data, most students who receive and use the Pell grant
at OU are receiving the maximum amount. Thus, any increases in their cost of attendance due to
taking more than 12 hours will not increase the amount of grant aid for which they are eligible.
Lastly, as Hemelt and Stange [2016] point out, there is a possibility that OU’s schools pric-
ing schemes coincide with other college level attributes or policies that can potentially influence
student course selection behavior. These include resources or advising for students. Because the
primary focus in this research is on the public four-year sector in one state and at one institution it
eliminates any institutional differences that correlate with pricing structure nationally
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Credit Per Semester
The results for equation 1 are presented in Table 3.4. Row 1 shows the prediction a student
on FRT will register for more than 15 credit hours, between 12-15 credit hours, or between 16-18
credit hours compared to pay per hour. When analyzing all students that were on FRT, we see
the same increase in likelihood as Hemelt and Stange [2016]. Equation 1 predicts the likelihood
that students under FRT register for more than 15 credit hours is 2.8%. Equation 1 also shows
FRT students are 8.7% less likely to register between 12-15 credit hours and 1.3% more likely to
register for 16-18 hours.
Rows 2-4 show the results for the mixed cohorts when each cohort was on FRT for a different
amount of years. Students that were on FRT for just one year do not show any big changes in
registration behavior. The model predicts that students will register for over 15 hours by 0.5%,
but it is not significant. Students in this cohort are also 1.1% less likely to register between 12-15
hours 1.3% more likely to register between 16-18 hours. This is expected because they were the
first cohort to be able to take advantage of FRT and might have not been as aware, or for many
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already close to graduation and not needing to go over a 15 credit hour semester.
Row 3 shows the results for students that were a 50/50 split between pay per credit and FRT.
The model predicts that these students are 1.9% more likely to register for over 15 credit hours.
The model also shows that they are −2.9% likely to register for between 12-15 credit hours and
2.1% more likely to register for between 16-18. Lastly, students that only experienced per credit
hour for 1 year and FRT for 3 years show a predicted increase in registering for over 15 credit
hours by 3.3%. They are also 3.9% less likely to register between 12-15, and 2.8% more likely to
register between 16-18.
All of these result follow each other. In general students under FRT will register for more than
15 credit hours and not between 12-15. As the number of years a student is on FRT increases,
they are more likely to register for more than 15 credit hours compared to students that had less
experience with FRT.
3.5.2 GPA Analysis
Turning to equation 2, and focusing on a students semester, yearly, and graduation GPA (Tables
3.5-3.7) we are able to see that students under FRT are possibly optimizing because they all have
higher GPA’s compared to non-FRT students. Hemelt and Stange [2016]’s basic model predicts that
students would try and register for an additional hour or hours if they thought it would maximize
their future outcome. One concern with the model was it was “lumpy”, meaning that if it was
optimal for a student to register for just one credit hour this would be difficult or not possible
because most classes are 3-4 credit hours. But from the data, on average, students on FRT were
registering for 3 hours. When the marginal cost to register for over 15 hours is 0, we believe that
they are able to get around the uncertainty problem, “test drive” classes, and within the 2 week
window drop with no penalty. Thus, they are able to pick the classes they think they will do best
in that semester. The results from equation 2 show just that. Again, in this model the standard
errors are clustered to account for correlation in the errors among students at the same college or
major. Tables 3.5-3.7 show the results for the semester, yearly, and graduation GPA’s for students
86
that were under FRT and Mixed years compared to those that were not or on a different level of
mixed years.
All the results back up the findings from the credit hours linear probability model, and show
that in general students on FRT register for more classes and have higher semester, yearly, and
graduation GPA. Specifically, students on FRT have a semester GPA that is 3.5% higher, a yearly
that is 3.1% higher, and a graduation GPA that is 2.6% higher. Breaking it down among the mixed
FRT cohorts we see that the longer duration on FRT the higher the percentage increase in semester,
year, and graduation GPA . A student that is on FRT for one year has a semester increase of 1.8%
compared to a student that is on FRT for 3 years has a semester increase of 2.5%. The same is
true with yearly, 1.5% compared to 2.0%. Graduation GPA was the closest margin in difference
with one year students receiving a 1.4%, where as 3 year FRT students see a 1.8% increase. This
is ideal, because your graduation GPA is a key component in labor market job placements. Higher
GPA’s means a better possible job placement and higher future lifetime income.
The most interesting result is how close the point estimates are between the 2 year and 3 year
FRT cohorts. All the point estimates are nearly identical, leading us to believe that the change
in behavior was quick. This could reflect marketing from the university or the academic advisors
promoting FRT.
Breaking it down, the mean GPA for per credit hour cohorts was 3.19. If they would have
received the 2.6% graduation boost FRT students had, their GPA’s would have been 3.28 This
might have opened more doors for students in the labor market. We can also do the same with the
mixed group that have a mean GPA of 3.16, under FRT it would have been 3.25. These increases
sound small but in the labor market when possible employers are looking at undergraduates they
might be that small edge that separates them from others.
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3.6 Conclusion
This study used a rich administrative data on all University of Oklahoma incoming freshman
cohorts from the fall of 2009 through spring of 2018. our paper further extends the initial analysis
that Hemelt and Stange [2016] and further provides evidence on whether students educational
investments respond to marginal price incentives. We find that a zero marginal price system (taking
more than 15 credit hours) students are 2.6% more likely to take more than 15 hours, −7.9% less
likely to attempt between 12-15 and 1.8% percent more likely to attempt between 16-18 credit
hours. We also are able to see how students that experienced FRT for a different number of years
(i.e. 1, 2, or 3) compare not only against each other but also to students that never experienced
FRT. This analysis showed that the longer a student was under FRT, the more likely they were to
attempt more credit hours. Case in point, students that were on FRT for only 1 year were only 1.7
percent more likely to attempt betwee 16-18 credit hours, where as students that experienced FRT
for 3 years were 3.3 percent more likely.
The data also suggest that additional attempted credits hours does not appear to mean students
are earning more credits in a semester or cumulatively, or reducing the time-to-degree completion.
We do want to note that these estimates of these outcomes are admittedly less precise and more
variable across specifications. We believe here students have learned to optimize by registering
for a higher course load than they intend to take the following semester, then within the 2 week
drop period “test driving” each class to see which ones they would do best in, then dropping the
the one class they think would be the hardest for their current situation. This hypothesis aligns
with the findings we see in increases in semester, year, and graduation GPA’s for students under
FRT. Specifically, students under FRT saw a 2.6% increase in graduation GPS’s when compared
to those that were on per credit hour pricing. Again, our data allows us to look at different cohorts
that experienced different number of years on FRT. Students that had one year of FRT saw a slight
increase of 1.8% compared to students that had 3 years of FRT who saw a semester GPA increase
of 2.5%. This does come at a cost, because when higher rank classmates (i.e. seniors and juniors)
are allowed to register before lower level classmates (i.e. freshman and sophomore’s), then they
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can possibly register for a class that they will eventually drop where a lower level classmate could
have fill the seat.
Universities across the country have many different views on flat rate tuition, and its effective-
ness. They are looking at hard choices that they know will highly impact not only their student
body but also revenue and recruitment. The main selling point for universities with FRT is that it
allows a student to take more classes for free and to Finish in Four, as advertised on the University
of Oklahoma’s web page. It also increase the ranking for the university if they can show that more
students are graduating with better GPA’s and/or sooner because those are two key metrics a school
is graded on.
Many universities across the country are switching to a Four-Year Locked Rate which is a
compounded four-year average, allowing for a per semester fixed rate of required tuition and fees
for twelve consecutive full semesters, or four consecutive years, from the time of first enrollment in
an institution of higher education after high school. The only draw back with these pricing systems
is either the university will widely benefit or the student will. If a students chooses the locked rate
and during the time they are in college interest rates go down they are paying at a higher interest
locked rate. The same is true for the university, if the interest rate goes up are charging at a lower
locked rate then they otherwise could have received. With these systems there is more uncertainty
as compared to FRT, where per year the university can adjust the flat 15 costs based on the current
market rates.
Our finding show that flat rate tuition, at the University of Oklahoma, has impacts its student
body in regards to registered credit-taking and achievement stands (GPA) in contrast to students
that were not on FRT. Our theoretical extensions describe how students would increase enrollment
even if the optimal level was 1 credit hour. In reality most classes are 3 or 4 hours, and the data we
have shows that on average students on FRT “horde” 3 hours allowing them to register for more
class in their current semester and then drop one class the following. This partially allows them
to get around the uncertainty of guessing the class difficulty and pick the classes they believe they
will performer best, during that given semester. Our results are also consistent with the presence
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of marginal adjustment frictions, large or uncertain marginal effort costs, or large nonlinear returns
to degrees.
Another explanation for the effects of marginal price on college outcomes is that marginal
pricing policies may help explain student choice in credits based on the overall (average) price,
which determines enrollment and college choice. At the University of Oklahoma they have seen
tuition prices increased due to less state and local funding and students may be optimizing to try
and lessen the cost to GPA ratio by hording and optimizing the classes they take.
Our study covered several limitations that Hemelt and Stange [2016] pointed out. Our data
allowed to get around the differences in institutional characteristics as a source of bias. We were
able to exam the experience of an institution that recently changed it’s marginal price. Our results
also were able to dig deeper into the choices students make after entering college allowing us to
better understand the mechanisms at work. We look at the mix cohort group and examine students
that were on FRT for 1, 2, and 3 years and non-FRT students. We showed that the more years a
student was on FRT the better semester GPA they had and the more likely they were to register for
more classes. We also were able to control for major choice among freshman and able to track if
the major choice changed by graduation date. Having FASFA and Pell grant data also allowed us
to control for financial burden. Future analysis should look at a comparison of schools on FRT and
those like Texas AM, that offer a locked or flexible rate payment plan to see what option provides
the best options for their student body. Future work should examine student registration and GPA’s
between FRT and Locked Rate Tuition. In general though, with ever rising costs to attend college,
any option policymakers create should be closely analyzed to make sure there are no unintended
negative consequences that would put the student body and university in a worse situation than the
current system.
3.7 Tables and Figures
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Table 3.4: Linerar Probability Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES Over 15 Hours 12-15 Hours 16-18 Over 15 Hours 12-15 Hours 16-18 Hours Over 15 Hours 12-15 Hours 16-18 Hours Over 15 Hours 12-15 Hours 16-18 Hours
FRT 0.028*** -0.087*** 0.013***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
1 Year FRT 0.005 -0.011** 0.013***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
2 Year FRT 0.019*** -0.029*** 0.021***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
2 Year FRT 0.033*** -0.039*** 0.028***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
Financial Aid 0.054*** 0.006 0.031*** 0.036*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.041*** 0.015** 0.025*** 0.041*** 0.015** 0.023***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
Stafford Loan 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.010*** -0.002 0.025*** -0.006 -0.008 0.016* -0.004 0.014 0.001 0.014**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006)
Pell Grant -0.019*** 0.025*** -0.011*** 0.007 0.002 0.003 -0.007 0.023*** -0.006 -0.035*** 0.038*** -0.028***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007)
African American -0.004 -0.020*** -0.002 -0.031** -0.003 -0.020** 0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.020* -0.008 -0.014
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008)
Asian -0.012** -0.017*** -0.003 -0.018* -0.024*** -0.008 -0.028*** -0.017** -0.010* -0.024*** -0.021*** -0.011*
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
Pacific Islander -0.018 -0.017 -0.004 -0.013 -0.014 -0.011 -0.016 -0.008 -0.029 0.006 -0.057* 0.015
(0.021) (0.020) (0.015) (0.036) (0.034) (0.020) (0.033) (0.030) (0.019) (0.026) (0.033) (0.023)
American Indian -0.000 0.009** -0.004 0.002 -0.008 0.007 0.003 0.012 0.001 -0.002 0.011 -0.010
(0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006)
Hispanic -0.013** 0.006 -0.005 -0.027*** 0.002 -0.008 -0.017 -0.002 0.005 -0.024** -0.003 -0.006
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008)
Male -0.019*** 0.021*** -0.014*** -0.023*** 0.019*** -0.015*** -0.020*** 0.012** -0.010*** -0.015** 0.018*** -0.010**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
In State -0.047*** 0.001 -0.025*** -0.042*** -0.007 -0.021*** -0.046*** -0.007 -0.022*** -0.045*** -0.005 -0.021***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
International 0.003 -0.081*** 0.019* 0.016 -0.097*** -0.002 -0.004 -0.085*** 0.003 -0.011 -0.097*** 0.014
(0.014) (0.008) (0.010) (0.018) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) (0.020) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014)
Observations 193,160 193,160 193,160 70,188 70,188 70,188 72,328 72,328 72,328 72,497 72,497 72,497
R-squared 0.024 0.025 0.021 0.025 0.020 0.024 0.026 0.020 0.024 0.026 0.022 0.025
Major FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Clustered S.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Results are the probability that a FRT, student will or will not register for a certain course load compared to those that were not. Row 1 shos FRT to non FRT, including the mixed years FRT students. Rows 2-4 break out the differences in students
that experienced different years under FRT. Standard errors are clustered at the major level, and the sample only includes full time students that would be subjected to FRT.
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Table 3.5: Semester GPA Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Ln GPA Ln GPA Ln GPA Ln GPA
Flat Rate 0.035***
(0.005)
1 Year FRT 0.018***
(0.005)
2 Years FRT 0.025***
(0.007)
3 Years FRT 0.025***
(0.008)
Financial Aid Received 0.075*** 0.069*** 0.066*** 0.065***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
Stafford Loan -0.042*** -0.050*** -0.057*** -0.047***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Pell Grant -0.021*** -0.021** -0.003 -0.014*
(0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
African American -0.087*** -0.108*** -0.100*** -0.091***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
Asian -0.003 -0.017* -0.003 -0.011
(0.004) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008)
Pacific Islander -0.020 0.013 0.016 -0.027
(0.013) (0.020) (0.018) (0.024)
American Indian -0.016*** -0.021*** -0.012* -0.019***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
Hispanic -0.030*** -0.034*** -0.018** -0.037***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Male -0.038*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.040***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
In State -0.012*** -0.010** -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
International -0.008 -0.001 -0.001 -0.015
(0.013) (0.022) (0.018) (0.017)
Observations 187,677 67,536 69,726 69,975
R-squared 0.067 0.064 0.062 0.061
Major FE YES YES YES Yes
Semester FE YES YES YES Yes
Clustered S.E. YES YES YES Yes
Results are the log of a students semester GPA under FRT compared to those that were
not. Column 1 is all FRT compared to no FRT. Columns 2-4 show how as the number of
years a student was on FRT they had a higher percentage increase between the one year
and two year FRT cohorts, but 2 year and 3 year FRT cohorts had the same benefit in
their semester GPA.
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Table 3.6: Yearly GPA Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Ln GPA Ln GPA Ln GPA Ln GPA
Flat Rate 0.031**
(0.005)
1 Year FRT 0.015***
(0.005)
2 Years FRT 0.019***
(0.007)
3 Years FRT 0.020***
(0.008)
Financial Aid Received 0.072*** 0.064*** 0.062*** 0.062***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Stafford Loan -0.042*** -0.048*** -0.054*** -0.046***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Pell Grant -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.005 -0.012*
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
African American -0.082*** -0.101*** -0.096*** -0.087***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008)
Asian -0.003 -0.018* -0.003 -0.009
(0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007)
Pacific Islander -0.020 0.017 0.021 -0.028
(0.013) (0.019) (0.016) (0.024)
American Indian -0.015*** -0.020*** -0.011 -0.019***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Hispanic -0.029*** -0.031*** -0.018** -0.039***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Male -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.040***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
In State -0.011*** -0.008* -0.013*** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
International -0.006 0.004 0.003 -0.012
(0.012) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017)
Observations 187,937 67,655 69,850 70,088
R-squared 0.091 0.088 0.083 0.084
Major FE YES YES YES Yes
Semester FE YES YES YES Yes
Clustered S.E. YES YES YES Yes
Results are the log of a students yearly GPA under FRT compared to those that were
not. Column 1 is all FRT compared to no FRT. Columns 2-4 show how as the number of
years a student was on FRT they had a higher percentage increase in their yearly GPA.
Results show that between the two year FRT cohort and 3 year FRT cohort they receive
almost the same benefit.
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Table 3.7: Graduation GPA Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Ln GPA Ln GPA Ln GPA Ln GPA
Flat Rate 0.026***
(0.004)
1 Year FRT 0.014***
(0.005)
2 Years FRT 0.018***
(0.006)
3 Years FRT 0.018***
(0.007)
Financial Aid Received 0.067*** 0.060*** 0.058*** 0.058***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Stafford Loan -0.038*** -0.043*** -0.048*** -0.043***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Pell Grant -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.004 -0.013*
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
African American -0.075*** -0.093*** -0.087*** -0.078***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
Asian 0.003 -0.009 0.004 -0.001
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006)
Pacific Islander -0.016 0.014 0.019 -0.020
(0.012) (0.018) (0.014) (0.023)
American Indian -0.013*** -0.017** -0.010 -0.016***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
Hispanic -0.026*** -0.029*** -0.016** -0.036***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
Male -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.037***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
In State -0.007** -0.005 -0.009** -0.008**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
International -0.005 0.005 0.006 -0.009
(0.012) (0.021) (0.018) (0.017)
Observations 187,981 67,680 69,879 70,116
R-squared 0.173 0.168 0.161 0.162
Major FE YES YES YES Yes
Semester FE YES YES YES Yes
Clustered S.E. YES YES YES Yes
Results are the log of a students graduation GPA under FRT compared to those that were
not. Column 1 is all FRT compared to no FRT. Columns 2-4 show how as the number of
years a student was on FRT they had a higher percentage increase between the one year
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Table A1: Masked Data Comparison
(FE) (FE) (FE) (FE)
Low Middle High Dropped
UFB -0.182*** -0.166*** -0.161*** -0.189***
(0.031) (0.023) (0.020) (0.023)
Total Students 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Black Rate 0.027*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.018***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Asian Rate -0.032*** -0.027*** -0.024*** -0.021***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Hispanic Rate 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Free and Reduced Lunch Rate 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Annual County Wage 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Annual County Employees -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sample Years 12-17 12-17 12-17 12-17
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 53,074 53,074 53,074 30,620
R-squared 0.326 0.384 0.405 0.458
Results are in the IHS (Inverse Hyperbolic Sine), and total students per school is controlled
for. Each of the control variables is a rate. For all the schools the demographics, including
free lunch, rates are calculated and used in the regression. School level demographics such as
total students and ethnicity are controlled for. Year 2012 represents school year 2011/2012,
and year 2017 represents school year 2016/2017. Columns 1 is when the low parameter (all
masked data is replaced with 1) is used for the masked data, columns 2 is when the middle
parameter (masked data is replaced with 5), 3 is when the high parameter is used (masked data
replaced with 9), and column 4 is when the masked data is dropped. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table A2: UFB Participation by Free-Reduced Eligible Rates
2015/2016-2017/2018 2011/2012-2014/2015
UFB Rate % of Total Schools UFB Rate % of Total Schools
90% + 1 5.00 .524 15.8
80% - 89% 1 10.1 .356 17.8
70% - 79% .471 17.0 .360 13.6
60% - 69% .345 15.9 .276 12.7
50% - 59% .223 14.6 .179 11.7
40% - 49% .155 12.3 .120 9.21
30% - 39% .10 8.51 .101 6.72
20% - 29% .071 6.41 .063 4.89
10% - 19% .026 5.56 .058 4.43
1% - 9% .014 4.10 .011 3.24
The schools are separated by their Free and Reduced eligible rates. The Texas Senate passed
bill 376 in 2013 that required all public schools with a Free and Reduced eligible rate of 80% or
higher to participate in UFB. Before this bill was passed it was the schools choice. 85% of the
schools that were required after 2013 to take part in UFB had already been in UFB prior to the
bill becoming law. Texas Department of Agriculture was only able to provide school level meals
and snacks served for school years 2011/2012 to present. UFB Rate is the number of schools in
the sample years that participate in UFB.
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Table A3: IHS, LN, and LN+1 Comparison
(1) (2) (3)
IHS Campus Total LN Campus Total LN Plus One Campus Total
UFB -0.166*** -0.166*** -0.166***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Observations 53,074 53,074 53,074
R-squared 0.384 0.384 0.384
IHS CC Total LN CC Total LN Plus One CC Total
UFB -0.161*** -0.161*** -0.161***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Observations 46,536 46,536 46,536
R-squared 0.356 0.356 0.356
IHS Substance Total LN Substance Total LN Plus One Substance Total
UFB -0.122*** -0.123*** -0.123***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Observations 15,463 15,463 15,463
R-squared 0.577 0.577 0.577
IHS Truancy Total LN Truancy Total LN Plus One Truancy Total
UFB -0.221*** -0.223*** -0.223***
(0.076) (0.076) (0.076)
Observations 3,156 3,156 3,156
R-squared 0.437 0.437 0.437
IHS Fighting Total LN Fighting Total LN Plus One Fighting Total
UFB -0.135*** -0.135*** -0.135***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Observations 19,095 19,095 19,095
R-squared 0.360 0.360 0.360
District FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Robust S.E. YES YES YES
Sample Years 2012/2013-2017/2018 2012/2013-2017/2018 2012/2013-2017/2018
Point estimates were rounded to the third decimal point. District fixed effects and robust standard errors were
used on all the estimates for all three types of variables. IHS was the primary variable used in the main
estimations because the sub groups do have 0s and we did not want to exclude them from the analysis. The
inverse sine is approximately equal to log(Yit(1 + Y 2it)
0.5 where Yit is the conflict report for school i during time
t, thus it can be interpreted in exactly the same way as a standard logarithmic dependent variable.
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9 $6, 930 $3, 780 $630
5 $9, 450 $6, 300 $3, 150
2 $11, 340 $8, 190 $5, 040
The above payoff matrix show the possible different
combinations that high schools can see as increased at-
tendance revenues when they participate in UFB and it
reduces their truancy rates by 20%. 20,15,10 represent
days that a truant student would miss. 9,5,2 represent the
number of days a non truant student would miss. Look-
ing at row 1 column 1 the $6, 930 would come from a
truant student missing 20 days to now being non-truant
and missing 9 days. The mean truancy rate across all
high schools that do not participate in UFB is 62. When
these schools participate in UFB truancy drops by 20%,
or a reduction of 14 reports. The state pays each school
$45 a day for each student in attendance. Truancy kicks
in when a student has missed 10 or more days in one
semester, but the average student misses only 2-4 days a
semester. We estimate that schools will not see the ex-
tremes but some placement near the middle of the ma-
trix.
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Figure .0A1: Discipline Groups Breakdown
Code of Conduct Weapon
21-VIOLATED LOCAL CODE OF CONDUCT 11-FIREARM VIOLATION
12-ILLEGAL KNIFE
Fighting 13-CLUB
17-MURDER/ATTEMPTED MURDER 14-PROHIBITED WEAPON




48-CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE 01-PERMANENT REMOVAL BY TEACHER
49-ENGAGES IN DEADLY CONDUCT 23-EMERGENCY PLACEMENT/EXPULSION
08-RETALIATION AGAINST DIST EMPL
Truancy 27-ASSAULT-DISTRICT EMPLOYEE
42-TRUANCY - PARENT CONTRIBUTE TO 28-ASSAULT-NONDISTRICT EMPLOYEE
43-TRUANCY - 3 UNEXCUSED ABSENCES 29-AGG ASSAULT-DISTRICT EMPLOYEE
44-TRUANCY - 10 UNEXCUSED ABSENCE 30-AGG ASSAULT-NONDIST EMPLOYEE
45-TRUANCY - FAILURE TO ENROLL 31-SEXUAL ASSAULT-DIST EMPLOYEE
32-SEXUAL ASSAULT-NONDIST EMPLOYE
Substance 02-CONDUCT PUNISHABLE AS A FELONY
04-CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE/DRUGS 07-PUBLIC LEWDNESS/INDCT EXPOSURE
05-ALCOHOL VIOLATION 09-TITLE 5 FELONY - OFF CAMPUS
33-TOBACCO 10-NON-TITLE 5 FELONY-OFF CAMPUS
36-FELONY CONTROLLED SUBS VIOLAT 16-ARSON
37-FELONY ALCOHOL VIOLATION 18-INDECENCY WITH A CHILD





There were over 50 total individual discipline categories that a school can report. Categories that were similar in
nature were grouped together. Code of Conduct was the most reported and accounted for 31% of all the actions
reported.
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Figure .0A2: Free Lunch Quantile Demographics and Results
Free lunch quantiles are broken up into Q1 the bottom 25%, with a rate less than 34.4%, Q2 (25%− 50%) with a rate
between 34.5-49.1, Q3 (50%− 75%) with a rate between 49.2-65.9, and Q4 with a rate that is > 66%. Once each
quantile was isolated the estimation was run with district and time fixed effects and county and school demographics.
Robust standard errors were used, and results are significant to the 99% level. These results help show that UFB
helps reduce the stigma associated with Free/Reduced lunches. The mechanism here are schools with lower Free
lunch rates see lower participation, but when that is removed, they not only serve more meals but also have lower
conflicts in schools.
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